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THE APPLICABILITY OF THE ATEORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE TO COMMUNICATIONS WITH
FOREIGN LEGAL PROFESSIONALS
by Daiske Yoshida*
INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, courts have seen a significant increase in law-
suits involving foreign and multinational corporations,1 particularly in
intellectual property cases.2 Often in such lawsuits, juries award mul-
timillion-dollar damages3 and plaintiffs seek to treble them for willful
infringement.4 With such large sums at stake, discovery plays a cen-
tral role in these disputes.5
U.S. federal courts allow few barriers against total disclosure,6 the
attorney-client privilege being the oldest.7 In contrast, discovery in
* The author is a native speaker of Japanese and has been employed as a profes-
sional legal translator and interpreter for over five years. The editors of the Fordham
Law Review rely on his expertise regarding cites to untranslated Japanese-language
publications.
1. See Lucinda A. Low, Virtually All Areas of Law Profession Face Globalization,
Nat'l L., Aug. 5, 1996, at C9; Hans Smit, The Explosion in International Litigation,
Metropolitan Corp. Couns., Oct. 1996, at 59.
2. See Lawrence B. Friedman & Ayala Deutsch, More Foreign Firms File IP
Claims in U.S. Courts, Nat'l L., Oct. 28,1996, at C34 (describing increased U.S. pat-
ent ownership by foreign, particularly Japanese, companies, and a subsequent in-
crease in the number of lawsuits with foreign plaintiffs).
3. A study of patent cases from 1982-1994 found that, of 177 cases awarding dam-
ages, 61 resulted in damages between $1 million and $10 million and 25 resulted in
damages over $10 million. See Julie L. Davis & Allison C. Moran, An Historical Look
at Patent Infringement Damage Awards, in Intellectual Property Infringement Dam-
ages 3, 6 (Supp. 1995); see e.g., Minnesota ?Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson
Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (awarding damages of over
$106 million); Polaroid Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 16 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481,1541(D. Mass. 1990) (awarding $909 million); Smith Int'l Inc. v. Hughes Tool Co., 229
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81, 103 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (over $200 million). Recently, some ex-
tremely high jury awards have been vacated by the trial judge or overturned on ap-
peal before the Federal Circuit. See, e.g., Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., 102
F.3d 1214,1215 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (reversing a $253 million jury verdict); Litton Sys. Inc.
v. Honeywell Inc., No. 90-4823, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 729, at *177 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 4,
1995) (vacating a $1.2 billion jury award).
4. If a plaintiff can prove that a defendant willflly infringed the plaintiff's pat-
ent, the plaintiff is entitled to seek an enhancement to the damages award of up to
three times the amount of actual damages. Herbert F. Schwartz, Patent Law and Prac-
tice 117-18 (2d ed. 1995).
5. One commentator suggests that the broad scope of discovery is the primary
reason for the high costs associated with patent litigation in the United States. See
Alfred Ewert, Is IP Litigation in the U.S. Really Worth It?, Managing Intell. Prop.,
June 1995, at 27.
6. See id ("[In the United States] almost unlimited discovery is permitted.").
7. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389 (1981).
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foreign systems is much more limited." In those systems, communica-
tions between a client and a lawyer, or other legal professionals, are
never subject to disclosure.' One reason is that wide-open discovery
in the American style simply does not exist in other countries-for
example, Japan does not even have a term in its lexicon equivalent to
discovery." Also, and more importantly, those systems have well-es-
tablished rules of professional privilege."
Our broad discovery rules disadvantage foreign parties facing litiga-
tion in the United States by forcing them to reveal information even
when such disclosure could incur criminal penalties in their own legal
regimes.'" While American courts have generally ignored such con-
cerns and favored full discovery over any foreign secrecy interest, 13
8. Ewert, supra note 5, at 27 ("In civil law countries there is little if any discov-
ery."); see also Soci6td Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist.
Court, 482 U.S. 522, 563 n.21 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (noting that at the negotiations leading to the Hague Evidence Convention,
"civil-law countries revealed a 'gross misunderstanding' of the meaning of 'pre-trial
discovery,' thinking that it is something used before the institution of a suit to search
for evidence that would lead to litigation."); Ayako Ikeda, Practical Aspects of Patent
Litigation in Japan, Managing Intell. Prop., Feb. 1995, at 38, 40 ("[T]he Japanese sys-
tem does not allow extensive pre-trial discovery. In principle each party to the litiga-
tion has to gather evidence itself.").
9. See Virginia J. Harnisch, Confidential Communications Between Clients and
Patent Agents: Are They Protected Under the Attorney-Client Privilege?. 16 Hastings
Comm. & Ent. LJ. 433, 446 (1994).
10. Although sometimes the term shoko kaiji [evidence disclosure] is used, the
translation has been criticized as misleadingly narrow in the context of American civil
litigation. Eibeiho jiten [Dictionary of Anglo-American Law] 258 (1991 ed.); see also
Ikeda, supra note 8, at 40 (discussing the lack of discovery tools in the Japanese legal
system).
11. See Alison M. Hill, Note, A Problem of Privilege: In-House Counsel and the
Attorney-Client Privilege in the United States and the European Community, 27 Case
W. Res. J. Int'l L. 145, 157-58 (1995); see also David W. Louisell, Confidentiality,
Conformity and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 Tul. L. Rev. 101,
110-13 (1956) (discussing lawyer-client privilege around the world as based on tradi-
tional notions of duty and loyalty). The professional privilege rules of foreign coun-
tries are discussed infra Part II.
12. See Jack B. Weinstein, Recognition in the United States of the Privileges of
Another Jurisdiction, 56 Colum. L. Rev. 535, 537 (1956).
13. See, e.g., Socidt6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist.
Court, 482 U.S. 522, 542 (1987) ("It is well known that the scope of American discov-
ery is often significantly broader than is permitted in other jurisdictions, and we are
satisfied that foreign tribunals will recognize that the final decision on the evidence to
be used in litigation conducted in American courts must be made by those courts.");
Soci6t6 Internationale pour Paticipations Industrielles et Commerciales v. McGran-
ery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 444-45 (D.D.C. 1953), affd sub nom. Soci6t6 Internationale
pour Paticipations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Brownell, 225 F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir.
1955) ("[F]oreign law cannot be permitted to obstruct the investigation and discovery
of facts in a case, under rules established as conducive to the proper and orderly
administration of justice in the court of the United States."); In re Honda Am. Motor
Co. Dealership Relations Litig., 168 F.R.D. 535, 539 (D. Md. 1996) ("As to the liti-
gants themselves, it would be patently unfair to constrain plaintiffs' ability to discover
facts necessary to make their case .... While the scope of plaintiffs' discovery would
necessarily be limited under Japanese law, [the defendant] would have free reign to
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some courts have gone even further. These courts have pursued an
approach that, in effect, denies foreigners protection over their confi-
dential legal communications. 4 An American party that obtained
legal advice abroad could find such communications subject to discov-
ery if they were with non-lawyers, even if no other source of advice
existed in the foreign system. This problem affects both American
and foreign parties, defendants and plaintiffs alike.
The advisory role of legal professionals who are not "lawyers" (in-
sofar as they are not admitted to a bar of a court) in foreign systems is
much more significant than in the United States. Such professionals-
specializing in fields such as patent, tax, and corporate in-house coun-
seling-may, and are expected to, render legal advice to clients and
employers 1 5 In many countries, they are substantial, if not primary,
sources of legal advice.' 6
Based on their role in society and their relationships to their clients,
many types of foreign non-lawyer legal professionals act as attorneys
for all purposes relevant to the policies underlying the attorney-client
privilege.' 7 By not allowing attorney-client privilege to cover these
communications, courts disregard the realities of legal practice beyond
American borders. Even though we live in "a worldwide technologi-
cal and economic community,"18 it is a community hindered by peril-
ously inconsistent rules. By providing a back door through which a
clever litigant may obtain the otherwise undiscoverable confidences of
a client, such inconsistencies undermine not only the confidence of
foreign companies in the U.S. legal system but also the very purpose
of the attorney-client privilege. As the Supreme Court stated:
[I]f the purpose of the attorney-client privilege is to be served, the
attorney and client must be able to predict with some degree of cer-
tainty whether particular discussions will be protected. An uncer-
tain privilege, or one which purports to be certain but results in
discover all relevant facts pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."); see also
Weinstein, supra note 12, at 539 (asserting that American courts should compel disclo-
sure where testimony is vital, even if it would expose a party to liability abroad). But
see Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 552-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (stating, for a four-judge minority, that "courts are generally ill equipped to
assume the role of balancing the interests of foreign nations with that of our own,"
and would tend toward a pro-fornm bias).
14. See, e.g., Status Tune Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 95 F.R.D. 27, 32-33(S.D.N.Y. 1982).
15. See G. Gregory Letterman, Letterman's Guide to International Business
§ 1.57, at 1-87 (1996); John A. Nilsson, Dealing Effectively with Local Counsel
Abroad § 1.03, at 1-3 (1988).
16. I; see also Harnisch, supra note 9, at 445 (stating that in many foreign coun-
tries, patent agents are the "primary providers of legal services and advice for those
pursuing patent rights in the foreign patent office.").
17. See infra Part II.
18. Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 729 F. Supp. 234, 239 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (proposing
worldwide harmonization in patent litigation judgments).
1997]
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widely varying applications by the courts, is little better than no
privilege at all.' 9
This Note focuses on the application of the attorney-client privilege to
foreign non-lawyer legal professionals primarily in relation to patent
agents and patent attorneys. The analysis, however, may be applied
by analogy to other foreign legal professionals, such as in-house coun-
sel and tax advisers. Part I reviews the attorney-client privilege in the
United States, and discusses its expansion to patent agents registered
in the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO"). Part
II describes the role of patent advisers in foreign systems.. Part III
examines the case law dealing with the applicability of the attorney-
client privilege to foreign patent advisers, and the divergent theoreti-
cal rationales underlying those opinions. Part IV argues that none of
the existing approaches is satisfactory and proposes the use of a tem-
pered functional approach, which calls for a standardized analysis of
the role played by the foreign legal professional in advising clients.
This Note concludes that American courts should recognize a privi-
lege protecting substantive legal advice irrespective of where it is
given.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF ATORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN THE
UNITED STATES
The attorney-client privilege is the oldest privilege restricting disclo-
sure in Anglo-American law, and is firmly rooted in its jurispru-
dence.20 It is also the only communications privilege recognized in
every state.2' Dean Wigmore formulated the most traditional state-
ment of attorney-client privilege as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional
legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating
to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at
his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or
by the legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived.22
This definition has been the standard rule of privilege in the United
States. 3
19. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981).
20. Id at 389; 3 Weinstein's Federal Evidence § 503.03[1], at 503-9 (McLaughlin
ed. 1997) [hereinafter Weinstein, Federal Evidence].
21. Ford Motor Co. v. Leggat, 904 S.W.2d 643, 647 (Tex. 1995).
22. 8 Wigmore on Evidence § 2292 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
23. See Gregg F. LoCascio, Reassessing Attorney-Client Privileged Legal Advice in
Patent Litigation, 69 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1203, 1207 (1994). The Wigmore standard is
followed in the Second, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits. Id. at 1207 n.23.
In United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950), Judge
Wyzanski of the District Court of Massachusetts offered a restatement of the Wig-
more rule that is followed by the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Eleventh, and
District of Columbia Circuits. LoCascio, supra, at 1209 n.30. The court defined the
attorney-client privilege as follows:
[Vol. 66
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While each U.S. state has its own privilege rules,24 federal courts are
governed by Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Rule 501,
designed by Congress to preserve the existing state of privileges as
opposed to establishing specific statutory privileges, requires courts to
apply the "federal common law" of privilege. 6 As interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States,27 Rule 501 allows
courts to decide privilege issues on a case-by-case basis. 8 While this
reading may be consistent with the legislative history of the rule,2 it
has resulted in inconsistency and confusion at the margins of the privi-
lege.3" For example, although the Supreme Court held that American
(1) the asserted holder of the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2)
the person to whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the bar
of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this communication
is acting as a lawyer, (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the
attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers
(c) for the purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion of law or (ii)
legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the
purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a)
claimed and (b) not waived by the client.
89 F. Supp. at 358-59.
The Wigmore and United Shoe formulations are different in several respects, partic-
ularly in the description of the legal adviser. Whereas United Shoe requires that the
adviser be a "member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate," id. at 358, Wigmore
simply says "a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such." Wigmore, supra note
22, § 2292. This difference significantly impacts the treatment of non-lawyer legal
professionals for purposes of privilege. For a detailed comparison of the Wigmore
and United Shoe standards of privilege, see LoCascio, supra note 23, at 1230-38. The
United Shoe formulation has been criticized as being inconsistent with the purpose of
the privilege. See id. at 1232.
24. For a detailed listing of state privilege rules, see Wigmore, supra note 22,
§ 2292, at 555 n.2.
25. Fed. R. Evid. 501. The rule reads:
Except as otherwise required by the constitution of the United States or
provided by Act of Congress or in rules prescribed by the Supreme Court
pursuant to statutory authority, the privilege of a witness, person, govern-
ment, State, or political subdivison thereof shall be governed by the princi-
ples of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the
United States in the light of reason and experience. However, in civil ac-
tions and proceedings with respect to an element of a claim or defense as to
which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a witness, per-
son, government, State, or political subdivision thereof shall be determined
in accordance with State law.
Id.
26. See generally Daniel J. Capra, The Federal Law of Privileges, 16 Litig. 32
(1989) (discussing the impact of the rule on litigation).
27. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
28. Id at 396-97.
29. See id.
30. In Upjohn, the Supreme Court noted that a "case-by-case" approach may "un-
dermine desirable certainty in the boundaries of the attorney-client privilege," but
declined to establish generally fixed rules in this area. Id. This approach has been
criticized as causing uncertainty. See id. at 402-404 (Burger, Ci., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment); 1 McCormick on Evidence § 87.1, at 320 (4th ed.
1992); Stanley A. Freedman, Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege since Upjohn, at
Home and Abroad, 9 U. Dayton L. Rev. 425, 427-28 (1984).
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patent agents are engaged in the authorized practice of law,31 district
courts remain split over whether their communications are entitled to
privilege.3 Also, some states do not recognize a general privilege
covering legal communications between in-house counsel and corpo-
rate employees, 33 even though such a privilege was held to exist by the
Supreme Court.3 4 This creates practical difficulties for attorneys and
other legal advisers and, in turn, for their clients and potential clients.
In cases involving foreign legal professionals, this confusion is further
complicated as courts must venture into the unsettled area of conflict
of laws.35
A. Recognition of the Attorney-Client Privilege for Non-Lawyers
The rationale for attorney-client privilege is that it encourages peo-
ple to provide truthful and full information, enabling their legal ad-
viser to provide appropriate advice.36 At the same time, as Wigmore
noted, the attorney-client privilege stands in derogation of the public's
"right to every man's evidence, ' 37 and is "an obstacle to the investiga-
tion of the truth. '38 Thus, "[i]t ought to be strictly confined within the
narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its principle. 39
31. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 386 (1963).
32. See Harnisch, supra note 9, at 439 ("The status of patent agents and the attor-
ney-client privilege has yet to be definitely resolved thirty years after Sperry."); Lo-
Cascio, supra note 23, at 1209; John Ogilvie, Law++: Understanding the Differences
Between Attorneys, Blue Chips Magazine (July 1996) <http//www.ucs.org/mag/
archive/ju196.htm> ("There is... a split of opinion in the courts regarding 'privilege'
...."); compare In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 392-94 (D.D.C. 1978)
(recognizing the attorney-client privilege as protecting communications with patent
agents who are registered to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark
Office) with Joh. A. Benckiser G.m.b.H., Chemische Fabrik v. Hygrade Food Prods.
Corp., 253 F. Supp. 999, 1001 (D.N.J. 1966) (stating that the attorney-client privilege
does not extend to patent agents who are not members of a bar).
33. See, e.g., Consolidation Coal Co. v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 432 N.E.2d 250,257 (Ill.
1982) (reaffirming the "control group" test).
34. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 397.
35. See infra Part IV.
36. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 389; Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976).
Other justifications exist. For example, the traditional basis of the privilege in Anglo-
American law was a lawyer's sense of honor. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 87
F.3d 377, 381 n.5 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Colton, 201 F. Supp. 13, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1961),
affd 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962); Weinstein, supra note 12, at 536 n.7. The honor
rationale, however, diminished in England during the 18th century. See LoCascio,
supra note 23, at 1205-06. Privacy is another reason for the privilege suggested by
commentators. See Thomas G. Krattenmaker, Testimonial Privileges in Federal
Courts: An Alternative to the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 62 Geo. L.J. 61, 85-
89 (1973); Louisell, supra note 11, at 110-11; Michael Martin, Evidence: Modern Priv-
ilege Doctrine and Selective Waiver, N.Y. L.J., Apr. 10, 1992, at 3. Like honor, how-
ever, privacy also has been rejected in this country as a justification for the privilege.
See Steven Bradford, Conflict of Laws and the Attorney-Client Privilege: A Territorial
Solution, 52 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 909, 915 (1991).
37. Wigmore, supra note 22, § 2192 at 70.
38. Id § 2291, at 554.
39. Id
[Vol. 66
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Courts have frequently relied on this language to deny any perceived
expansion of the coverage of attorney-client privilege beyond its
strictest confines, i.e. certain types of communications between a
member of an American bar and a client.4 These courts make mem-
bership in an American bar the sine qua non on whether communica-
tions are privileged.41
The notion that the umbrella of attorney-client privilege may ex-
tend beyond attorneys admitted in a bar of the court, however, is far
from heretical, or even novel. In terms of policy interests, some au-
thorities place the protection of the client above the principle of open
disclosure, and do not specifically require bar membership. For exam-
ple, in proposing privilege rules for the Federal Rules of Evidence, the
Supreme Court Advisory Committee broadly defined a "lavyer" for
attorney-client privilege as "a person authorized, or reasonably be-
lieved by the client to be authorized, to practice law in any state or
nation."'4 Wigmore himself proposed that a "professional privilege"
40. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 361 (D.
Mass. 1950) (holding that the relationship between an in-house patent attorney and
his employer-corporation was "not that of attorney and client" and denying privi-
lege). But see Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395-96 (holding that the relationship between an
in-house attorney and his employer corporation may be privileged).
41. See, e.g., Novamont N. Am., Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., No. 91 Civ. 6482,
1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6622, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 6,1992); Status Time Corp. v. Sharp
Elecs. Corp., 95 F.R.D. 27,32-33 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Rayette-Faberge, Inc. v. John Oster
Mfg. Co., 47 F.R.D. 524, 526 (E.D. Wis. 1969); Joh. A. Benckiser G.mb.H., Chemis-
che Fabrik v. Hygrade Food Prods. Corp., 253 F. Supp. 999, 1001 (D.N.J. 1966).
42. Fed. R. Evid. proposed rule 503(a)(2), reprinted in Federal Rules of Evidence
with Advisory Committee Notes and Legislative History 306 (Christopher B. Mueller
& Laird C. Kirkpatrick eds., 1996) [hereinafter Mueller & Kirkpatrick] (emphasis ad-
ded). Proposed rule 503 provides, in pertinent part:
(a) Definitions. As used in this rule:
(1) A "client" is a person, public officer, or corporation, association, or
other organization or entity, either public or private, who is ren-
dered professional legal services by a lawyer, or who consults a law-
yer with a view to obtaining professional legal services from him.
(2) A "lawyer" is a person authorized, or reasonably believed by the
client to be authorized, to practice law in any state or nation.
(3) A "representative of the lawyer" is one employed to assist the law-
yer in the rendition of professional legal services.
(4) A communication is "confidential" if not intended to be disclosed to
third persons other than those to whom disclosure is in furtherance
of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication.
(b) General rule of privilege. A client has a privilege to refuse to disclose
and to prevent any other person from disclosing confidential communi-
cations made for the purpose of facilitating the rendition of professional
legal services to the client, (1) between himself or his representative and
his lawyer or his lawyer's representative, or (2) between his lawyer and
the lawyer's representative, or (3) by him or his lawyer to a lawyer rep-
resenting another in a matter of common interest, or (4) between repre-
sentatives of the client or between the client and a representative of the
client, or (5) between lawyers representing the client.
Id. at 306-307.
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be recognized for non-lawyer administrative practitioners on the prin-
ciple that people who seek their advice would be in the position of
clients.4 3 Wigmore, while noting that courts tend to deny such a privi-
lege, nevertheless recommended the following approach:
A correct test for recognizing professional privilege would seem to
be this: If the administrative department (bureau, board, commis-
sion, etc.) requires an oath of office and prior proof of professional
qualifications and maintains a list of registered persons so qualified,
or if in any other way its regulations treat the special practitioners as
a licensed body having the responsibility of attorneys and subject to
professional discipline, then the parties so represented are in
the status of clients, and the clients are therefore entitled to the
appropriate consequences, including the confidentiality of
communications."
Despite their general reluctance to recognize such a broad privilege,
courts applying the federal common law of privilege have held that
the attorney-client privilege is applicable to non-lawyers in certain cir-
cumstances.45 Courts generally agree that a non-lawyer acting as an
agent of an attorney may invoke the attorney-client privilege,46 and
Proposed rule 503, along with other privilege rules proposed by the Supreme Court,
was ultimately rejected by Congress. The main reason for the rejection was the un-
willingness of Congress to impinge on State privileges, or to be seen in any way as
"freezing" the law of privileges. See Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra, at 112, 115. Pro-
posed rule 503, however, has become a part of at least ten state statutes as Rule 502 of
the Uniform Rules of Evidence. See Helena M. Tavares, The United States Perspective
of Travelling with the Attorney-Client Privilege: Checked or Carry-on Baggage?, 7
Int'l L. Practicum 9, 10 (1994). Scholars have also endorsed the proposed standard as
the proper definition of attorney-client privilege. See id.; McCormick, supra note 30,
at 317 & 317 n.18; Weinstein, Federal Evidence, supra note 20, § 503.02, at 503-8; see
also In re Grand Jury Investigation, 918 F.2d 374,380 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[T]he proposed
rules provide a useful reference point and offer guidance in defining the existence and
scope of evidentiary privileges in the federal courts.").
As noted in the comments to proposed rule 503, "[t]here is no requirement that the
licensing state or nation recognize the attorney-client privilege, thus avoiding excur-
sions into conflict of laws questions." Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra, at 309. Thus, the
rule should protect communications with a legal practitioner who is licensed in a for-
eign country that does not recognize an attorney-client privilege.
43. Vrigmore, supra note 22, § 2300a, at 582 (stating that "[t]here is every reason
... for recognizing a privilege" for communications between clients and non-lawyer
representatives, such as administrative practitioners). By implication, the category of
"non-lawyer representatives" includes patent agents because almost all of the cases
cited in this section relate to patent agents. See id., § 2300a, at 582 n.2.
44. Id. at 582.
45. In addition to the federal cases discussed infra, state courts have extended the
attorney-client privilege to lay (i.e. non-lawyer) representatives. See, e.g., Welfare
Rights Org. v. Crisan, 661 P.2d 1073, 1077 (Cal. 1983) (in bank) (recognizing a privi-
lege for communications with authorized representatives of welfare claimants); see
also Julie B. Nobel, Note, Ensuring Meaningful Jailhouse Legal Assistance: The Need
for a Jailhouse Lawyer-Inmate Privilege, 18 Cardozo L. Rev. 1569 (1997) (proposing
the recognition of a privilege for communications with lay "jailhouse lawyers").
46. Harnisch, supra note 9, at 439 n.26. In United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918 (2d
Cir. 1961), Judge Friendly held that an accountant, when acting as an "interpreter" for
[Vol. 66
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that communications between lawyers and non-lawyers, including pat-
ent agents, accountants, and foreign legal professionals, may be pro-
tected by the attorney work-product doctrine once litigation is
contemplated.4 7 Beyond agency or attorney-work product doctrines,
however, federal courts have extended attorney-client privilege to
only one profession other than lawyers-patent agents.48
B. Application of the Attorney-Client Privilege to American
Patent Agents
In the United States, patent law practitioners may be divided into
two broad categories: patent attorneys and patent agents. Patent at-
torneys are lawyers who are licensed to practice general law, but spe-
cialize in patent law.49 Patent agents, on the other hand, are not
members of a bar, and are restricted to prosecuting patent applica-
tions and otherwise representing inventors before the USPTO.50
the lawyer, may be protected by the attorney-client privilege. Id. at 921-22; see also
John J. Tigue, Jr. et al., The Kovel Accountant Privilege, N.Y. LJ., May 19, 1994, at 3.
The Kovel privilege is the law in the Second Circuit and is even recognized in the
Internal Revenue Manual, but other circuit courts have not applied the privilege
under similar circumstances. Id. Courts have used the Kovel privilege to protect com-
munications with various non-lawyers other than accountants. See, e.g., United States
v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1036, 1045-46 (3d Cir. 1975) (psychiatrists); In re Witness-Attor-
ney Before Grand Jury No. 83-1,613 F. Supp. 394,397-98 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (bail bonds-
men); People v. George, 428 N.Y.S.2d 825, 827. (Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. 1980)
(polygraphers). The privilege also protects patent agents acting under the authority
and control of an attorney. See, e.g., Golden Trade, S.r.L v. Lee Apparel Co., 143
F.R.D. 514, 518-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); Cuno, Inc. v. Pall Corp., 121 F.R.D. 198, 204(E.D.N.Y. 1988); Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 146 (D. Del. 1977);
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Pullman Inc., 446 F. Supp. 771, 776 (W.D. OkIa. 1976).
Courts that recognize a privilege for foreign patent agents under an agency ration-
ale are careful to distinguish between communications where the attorney is merely
acting as a "conduit" for information to be submitted to the foreign patent office-
which would not be privileged-and when the patent agent is engaged in the "lawyer-
ing process"-in which case the position of the foreign patent agent may be the same
as that of co-counsel, and his communication privileged. See, e.g., Baxter Travenol
Labs., Inc. v. Abbot Labs., 1987 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10300, at "21 (N.D. M11. June 17,
1987); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 954 (N.D. MI. 1982); De-
tection Sys. Inc. v. Pittway Corp., 96 F.R.D. 152, 156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982).
47. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1171 (D.S.C. 1974).
48. Evidence rules relating to patent litigation pose a unique question, in that a
special court in Washington D.C.-the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit-has
exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent cases. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 26.
Under Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564, 1574-75 (Fed. Cir.
1984), the Federal Circuit generally defers to the evidence rules of the various circuits.
It is axiomatic, however, that the other circuit courts do not have evidence rules spe-
cific to patent litigation. Where the Federal Circuit has not spoken on evidentiary
questions unique to patent lawsuits, such as the issues of attorney-client privilege dis-
cussed in this Note, district courts are left with no controlling authority.
49. See William James Kopacz, Note: The European Patent Attorney Qualifying
Examination: An American Perspective, 69 J. Pat. & Trademark Off. Soc'y 47, 51
(1987).
50. Harnisch, supra note 9, at 434. There is some divergence of opinion as to
whether or not U.S. patent agents practice law, and whether they are therefore enti-
1997]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
In order to practice before the USPTO, both patent agents and pat-
ent attorneys must first take a patent bar examination administered by
the USPTO. 15 To take the exam, usually given only once per year, an
applicant must have a bachelor's degree in a recognized technical sub-
ject or equivalent scientific training.52 The test is given in two parts: a
multiple-choice test of USPTO rules and a long-answer test.5 3 The
multiple-choice questions require such skills as being able to calculate
the last possible date for responding to an action by the patent exam-
iner. 4 The long-answer section requires the test taker to draft claims
and amendments based on a long fact pattern, but does not require
any technical or scientific knowledge. The entire exam has a pass
rate ranging from 28% to 40%.56
Once admitted, the USPTO regulations require patent agents to fol-
low ethical rules modeled on the American Bar Association's Model
Code of Professional Responsibility,5 7 including Canon 4 on the attor-
ney-client privilege.5 8 Thus, patent agents are bound by the same eth-
ical rules as lawyers.5 9 Although the traditional view was that
tied to privilege. See Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383 (1963) (holding that patent
agents practice law); Harnisch, supra note 9, at 444 (advocating a consistent recogni-
tion by courts that U.S. and foreign patent agents engage in the authorized practice of
law); James J. Merek & David A. Guth, The Attorney-Client Privilege and U.S. Patent
Agents: A Workable Rule for Protecting Communications, 76 J. Pat. & Trademark
Off. Soc'y 591, 592 (1994) (asserting that "[t]here can be no question that patent
agents. . engage in the practice of law"). Contra Status Time Corp. v. Sharp Elecs.
Corp., 95 F.R.D. 27, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (recognizing the impact of Sperry, but read-
ing it narrowly as expanding privilege to patent attorneys who prosecute patent appli-
cations, not patent agents); Joh. A. Benckiser G.m.b.H., Chenische Fabrik v. Hygrade
Food Prods. Corp., 253 F. Supp. 999, 1001 (D.N.J. 1966) (holding that the attorney-
client privilege may not be extended to "administrative practitioners").
51. 37 C.F.R. § 10.7(b) (1996). The requirement is waived for an individual who
has been a patent examiner for four years. Id.
52. Career Opportunities in Intellectual Property Law (visited June 1, 1997) <http'//
www.patents.com/opportun.sht>.
53. Id.
54. Id
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Compare 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.20-.112 (1996), with Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility (1981).
58. 37 C.F.R. § 10.56 (1996). Under the PTO Code of Professional Responsibility,
a lawyer is prohibited from knowingly revealing a confidence or secret of his client. 37
C.F.R. § 10.57(b) (1996). The code defines "confidence" as information protected by
the attorney client privilege under applicable law, and "secret" as "other information
gained in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate
or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental
to the client." 37 C.F.R. § 10.57(a) (1996). The ABA's newer ethical rules, the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct (1983) [hereinafter Model Rules], no longer make this
distinction and more generally prohibit lawyers from revealing information "relating
to representation of a client." Model Rules, Rule 1.6.
59. See In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 393 (D.D.C. 1978); Verni-
tron Med. Prods., Inc. v. Baxter Labs., Inc., 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 324, 325 (D.N.J.
1975).
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communications with patent agents were not protected by the attor-
ney-client privilege,60 more recent decisions, following the Supreme
Court's decision in Sperry v. Florida,61 have extended the privilege to
American patent agents.' In Sperry, the Court stated that while pat-
ent agents are not licensed to the general practice of law, they are
engaged in the practice of law when prosecuting patent applications.'
Discussing the authorized activities of patent agents, the Court noted:
Such conduct inevitably requires the practitioner to consider and
advise his clients as to the patentability of their inventions under the
statutory criteria ... as well as to consider the advisability of relying
upon alternative forms of protection which may be available under
state law. It also involves his participation in the drafting of the
specification and claims of the patent application .... which this
Court long ago noted "constitute[s] one of the most difficult legal
instruments to draw with accuracy." 64
While the decision did not deal directly with attorney-client privilege,
some courts concluded that Sperry overturned the earlier rule regard-
ing the applicability of the privilege to patent agents6 and extended
its protection accordingly.' This view has not been embraced, how-
ever, in all post-Sperry decisions, 67 and sometimes has been character-
ized as the minority position.68 Thus, more than thirty years after
Sperry, the situation has yet to be settled definitively.69 This uncer-
60. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of Am., 121 F. Supp. 792, 794-95 (D.
DeL 1954).
61. 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
62. See cases cited infra note 66.
63. I, at 383, 386.
64. Id at 383 (quoting Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892)).
65. See eg., Hercules Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 147 (D. Del. 1977)
(stating that since Sperry, "[t]he holding of early cases such as Zenith Radio Corp....
is consequently of little weight"); Garrison v. General Motors Corp., 213 F. Supp. 515,
519 (S.D. Cal. 1963) (stating that the Sperry case is "poles apart from the Zenith
case").
66. See, e.g., Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 298, 304
(E.D.N.Y. 1992); Dow Chem. Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 129,
134 (E.D. Mich. 1985); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 393 (D.D.C
1978); Vernitron Med. Prods., Inc. v. Baxter Labs., Inc., 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 324,325
(D.NJ. 1975).
67. See, eg., Status Tume Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 95 F.R.D. 27, 31 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); Joh. A. Benckiser G.m.b.H., Chemische Fabrik v. Hygrade Food Prods. Corp.,
253 F. Supp. 999, 1000-02 (D.NJ. 1966). It should be noted that the precedential
value of Benckiser is suspect, given the same court's contrary opinion m Vernitron
nearly ten years later. Benckiser, 253 F. Supp. at 1002, Vernitron, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
at 325.
68. See Welfare Rights Org. v. Crisan, 661 P.2d 1073, 1079 (Cal. 1983) (in bank)
(Richardson, J., dissenting).
69. See Harnisch, supra note 9, at 439 ("The status of patent agents and the attor-
ney-client privilege has yet to be definitely resolved thirty years after Sperry."). But
see Weinstein, Federal Evidence, supra note 20, § 503.07[3] at 503-30 (asserting that
"[c]ommunications to a non-lawyer administrative practitioner or patent agent...
[are] not in themselves privileged" under proposed federal evidence rule 503(a)(2)).
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tainty disadvantages both domestic patent law advisers and their pro-
spective clients because they are unsure whether their
communications are protected.70 The applicability of attorney-client
privilege to patent agents is further complicated when the question
involves foreign non-lawyer advisers specializing in the patent laws of
their respective countries.
II. THE ROLE OF LEGAL PROFESSIONALS IN FOREIGN SYSTEMS
Perhaps inevitably, courts faced with determining privilege issues
relating to foreign legal professionals are guided by assumptions based
on American legal practice.71 But the status and role of lawyers in
foreign systems are significantly more limited than in the United
States, and non-lawyers thus perform many functions usually per-
formed in the United States by lawyers. The distinction is particularly
acute in the area of patent law. In the American legal system, parties
faced with patent or other intellectual property issues may seek advice
from any number of boutique law firms or general practice firms with
intellectual property experience.72 As this section discusses, foreign
legal systems, unlike the American system, do not have "patent bars"
consisting of technically knowledgeable lawyers.73 Instead, technically
proficient patent law professionals are authorized to practice patent
law and provide legal advice on such substantive issues as infringe-
ment and validity even though they are not lawyers.
A. Japan
The patent representation system in Japan offers the most striking
contrast to the system in the United States. Unlike American patent
This assertion is questionable, both in terms of support and reasoning. The support
consists of cases denying privilege to foreign, rather than domestic, patent agents. Id.
at 503-30 n.14. As discussed infra Part III, such cases involve considerations different
from purely domestic cases. Moreover, proposed rule 503(a)(2) specifically does not
require the formalities of membership in a bar, and instead requires only that the
legal adviser be "authorized, or reasonably believed by the client to be authorized, to
practice law in any state or nation." Fed. R. Evid. proposed rule 503(a)(2), reprinted
in Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 42, at 306. As the Supreme Court recognized in
Sperry, patent agents are authorized to practice law. 373 U.S. at 383. Clearly, the
standard posits the protection of clients' reasonable expectations as an important pol-
icy consideration.
70. See Merek & Guth, supra note 50, at 599 ("Inconsistent application by courts
of the attorney-client privilege in cases involving patent agents impairs the interests of
the intellectual property bar and, of course, the interests of clients who retain patent
agents.").
71. See, e.g., Vernitron, 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 325-26 (comparing the work of
foreign and American patent agents).
72. See Krysten Crawford, Culture Vultures, The Recorder, Apr. 25, 1996 (describ-
ing trend among large firms to develop intellectual property practices).
73. See Kopacz, supra note 49, at 51 (characterizing the United States patent attor-
ney as a "professional anomaly on the world scene").
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agents, Japanese benrishi (patent advisers)7' are formally trained and
authorized to provide legal advice regarding substantive legal matters
such as patent invalidity and infringement, and may act as advocates
in Japan Patent Office trials in appealing rejections and opposing pat-
ent applications. 7" Despite the substantive nature of their work, how-
ever, American courts have consistently denied privilege to the
communications of benrishi and their clients.
The "farming out" of legal duties to non-lawyers results from the
extremely narrow role that bengoshi (attorneys-at-law) play in the
Japanese legal system. This, in turn, is a consequence of a system that
severely restricts the population of lawyers. Only approximately 500
74. Although some courts have referred to benrishi as "patent agents," see, e.g.,
Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., No. 86 Civ. 1749, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3129, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1992), the term is more often translated as "patent
attorney." For example, "Benrishiho" is translated by the Code Translation Institute
of Japan as "Patent Attorney Law." Benrishiho [Patent Attorney Law], translated in
VI EHS Law Bulletin Series Japan No. 6890 (1991). Also, the official English name
of Benrishikai, the organization that all benrishi must join to practice, is "Japan Patent
Attorneys' Association" ("JPAA"). Benrisbiho, art. 6; JPAA's Internet Home Page
(visited Aug. 5, 1997) <http'//www.asahi-net.or.jpl-kb7h-egcyakuwarLhtm>. But see
Donald M. Spero, The U.S. and Japanese Patent Systems: A User's Comparison, in
Japanese Intellectual Property: The Japanese Patent System and Strategies of Com-
petitiveness 103, 105-06 (Japan Information Access Project ed., 1993) (translating
benrishi as "patent clerk"); Michael K. Young, The Japanese Legal System: History &
Structure, 2 Doing Business in Japan 1-3-42 (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1996) (translating
benrishi as "patent agent" and zeirishi as "tax agent"). Nevertheless, because the use
of either "patent agent" or "patent attorney" is one of the sources of the confusion
that is the subject of this Note, this Note refers to foreign legal practitioners by their
foreign-language titles. Where translated, the Note refers to the more neutral terms,
"patent advisers" and "tax advisers."
75. See Benrishiho, supra note 74, art. 9.
76. Se4 e.g., Bayer AG v. Barr Labs., Inc., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1655, 1660
(S.D.N.Y. 1994); Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 143 F.R.D. 611, 623-24
(E.D.N.C. 1992); Alpex, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3129, at *6-*7; Detection Sys., Inc. v.
Pittway Corp., 96 F.R.D. 152, 156 (W.D.N.Y. 1982). This has led some commentators
to recommend changes to Japan's privilege law. See Yoichiro Yamada, Beikoku no
bengoshi kokyaku shuhi tokken seido ga maneku Nippon benrishi seido no kiki:
Benrishiho kaisei no kinkyu teigen [The Danger to Japan's Patent Attorney System
Brought by the United States' Attorney-Client Privilege System: An Urgent Recom-
mendation to Revise the Patent Attorney Lawl, 47 Patento 22 (Mar. 1994). No such
revision has occurred, however.
In contrast, some United States courts have found German and French patent agent
communications to be privileged, even though their patent advisory systems are not
unlike that of Japan. See e.g., Golden Trade, S.r.L v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D.
514, 522-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (Germany); Duplan Corp. v. Deerin Milliken, Inc., 397
F. Supp. 1146, 1170 (D.S.C. 1974) (France). Compare statutes discussed infra notes
113 (France) and 115 (Germany), with infra notes 88-89 (Japan) The similarity of
these Japanese statutes to their French and German counterparts is not accidental.
Japanese laws were based on French and German models, and the Japanese Code of
Civil Procedure "is a faithful imitation of the German Code." See Yosiyuki Noda,
Introduction to Japanese Law 52-55,206 (Anthony t1 Angelo trans., 1976). This sim-
ilarity makes the disparate treatment by American courts even more difficult to
justify.
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out of 35,000 applicants pass the annual bar exam." As a result, legal
advice in certain areas of law-such as patent, tax, and general corpo-
rate representation-are provided by non-lawyer specialists.78
Although benrishi are not lawyers, they are authorized to do every-
thing that American patent agents can do and more. For example,
under Japan's Patent Attorney Law, benrishi are authorized to advise
clients on matters relating to not only patent prosecution, but also pat-
ent infringement and invalidity-both to assert patent rights, and to
defend against claims.79 Also, benrishi are the only non-lawyers in
Japan who may represent clients at trial as supporting counsel for
bengoshi.80
To qualify as a benrishi, one must take an exam in five required
subjects-patent law, utility model law, design patent law, trademark
law, and treaties-and choose three optional subjects out of 41.81 Of
the subjects, eight are the same as those given in the standard Japa-
nese bar examination-constitutional law, administrative law, civil
law, commercial law, civil procedure law, criminal procedure law, in-
ternational private law-and the remainder covers economics, mar-
keting, and specific areas of science and engineering."' Those who
pass this stage must then take an oral examination in industrial
properties.83 The exam, given once a year, has a pass rate of around
3% 4 (as compared to 2% for bengoshi85 ). Perhaps as a consequence
of the extremely rigorous qualification requirements, the number of
benrishi in Japan is much smaller than the number of patent agents
and patent attorneys in the U.S. The Japan Patent Attorneys' Associ-
ation ("JPAA")-of which all practicing benrishi must be a member-
77. Japan admitted only 520 new lawyers in 1996. Donald L. Morgan and Shirley
A. Chowdhary, Regulation of Foreign Law Firms: Slow Moves toward Liberalization,
E. Asian Exec. Rep., May 15, 1996, at 8. Current proposals call for that number to be
increased, but it is unclear when that may occur. Id.; see also Constance O'Keefe,
Legal Education in Japan, 72 Or. L. Rev. 1009, 1012 (1993); J. Mark Ramseyer, Law-
yers, Foreign Lawyers, and Lawyer-Substitutes: The Market for Regulation in Japan,
27 Harv. Int'l L.J. 499, 507 (1986).
78. See Letterman, supra note 15, at 1-90.
79. Benrishiho, supra note 74, art. 1.
80. See Benrishiho, supra note 74, art. 9; Christopher E. Chaise, Glossary of Im-
portant Japanese Patent Terms, in Japanese Patent Practice: Prosecution/Litigation A-
1 (American Intellectual Property Law Association ed., 1992); Young, supra note 74,
at 1-3-42.
81. See Benrishiho shikkorei [Patent Attorney Law Enforcement Ordinance],
translated in VI EHS Law Bulletin Series Japan No. 6891 (1991), art. 8; Benrishi
shiken youkou [Patent Attorney Examination Outline] (visited Aug. 5, 1997) <http://
www.jpo.miti.go.jp/patent/3h/youkou.htm>.
82. Benrishiho shikkorei, supra note 81, art. 8.
83. Id
84. Ramseyer, supra note 77, at 508.
85. Id at 507.
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claims 3,850 members,8 6 while the USPTO had registered more than
18,000 names. 7
Benrishi are governed by virtually the same ethical rules regarding
confidentiality as bengoshi. Confidentiality of communications is
guaranteed in two statutes: Article 281 of the Civil Procedure Code
and Article 22 of the Patent Attorney Law.89 The Civil Procedure
Code provides attorneys and patent agents the right to refuse to tes-
tify.90 The Patent Attorney Law provides for criminal sanctions
where confidential information of the client is disclosed without the
86. See JPAA's Internet Home Page, supra note 74. Remarkably, this small group
accounts for approximately one-third of the million or so patent documents published
each year around the world. Patent Information from Japan (last modified July 18,
1997) <http://www.epo.co.at/epolpatolisindex.htm>.
87. The list of attorneys and patent agents registered with the USPTO is available
at the United States Patent Office Home Page (last modified July 18, 1997) <httpJ/
www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcomlolia/oed/roster>.
88. Mnsoho [Civil Procedure Code] (1889), translated in II EHS Law Bulletin
Series Japan (1992), art. 281. The Civil Procedure Code was amended for the first
time in more than 100 years through Law No. 109 of 1996 (expected to take effect
January 1, 1998), in part to expand the traditionally limited scope of discovery. See
generally Toshiaki Hasegawa, Shin minsoho: Bunsho kanri no yoten [The New Civil
Procedure Code: Major Points in Document Management] 1-4. The new code, which
has not yet been translated into English, does not deal specifically with attorney-client
privilege. Id at 85-86. Article 281, which remains substantially the same in Article
197 of the new code, id at 148, provides that a witness may refuse to testify-.
In case a doctor, dentist, pharmacist, druggist, mid-wife, lawyer (including a
foreign solicitor), patent attorney, advocate, notary public or an occupant of
a post connected with religion or worship or a person who was once in such
profession is questioned regarding the facts which came to his knowledge in
the course of performance of his duties and which should be kept secret.
Minsoho, art. 281(2). Japanese academics generally regard this law as providing the
clearest expression of communication privileges under Japanese law. Se e.g.,
Hideyuki Kobayashi, Minji jiken ni okeru shoko no shushuw Soronteki kosatsu [Col-
lection of Evidence in Civil Cases: General Observations], 46 Jiyu to Seigi 33,35 (Sep.
1995). One American court, however, has interpreted this rule as stopping short of a
client's right to refuse to produce documents relating to communications with a pat-
ent attorney. Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., No. 86 Civ. 1749, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3129, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1992); see infra notes 237-41 and accompa-
nying text.
89. Benrishiho, supra note 74, art. 22. Article 22 provides:
Any patent attorney or any person who was a patent attorney shall, in case
he has, without due reasons, divulged, or made surreptitious use of the
secrets of any person which may have come to his knowledge in the course
of performance of his business, be punished with penal servitude for not
exceeding six months or a fine not exceeding three thousand yen.
Id.
90. See Minsoho, supra note 88, art. 281(2). It should be noted that under both
the old and new Civil Procedure Code, parties in Japanese litigation are given broad
latitude in withholding documents. See Hasegawa, supra note 88, at 22. Specifically,
parties are permitted to withhold documents that are for personal use (such as notes
or internal memoranda), concern technical or trade secrets, or contain information
that members of certain professions-such as lawyers, patent advisers and doctors-
learned in the course of their business. Id.
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client's consent.91 Thus, clients seeking patent-related legal advice in
Japan are justified in expecting communications with benrishi to be
protected from disclosure in the context of litigation or otherwise.'
B. United Kingdom
Patent representation in the United Kingdom is much more similar
to the United States system, but differs significantly because it pro-
vides a statutory privilege for patent agents. In Britain, it is a criminal
offense to use the title of "patent agent" without being on the official
list of qualified practitioners, known as the Register of Patent
Agents.93 The Register is maintained by the Chartered Institute of
Patent Agents ("CIPA"), which was granted a Royal Charter in
1891. 94 To be registered, patent agents must spend several years in
training and pass two sets of examinations.95 Once admitted, patent
agents must adhere to CIPA's Rules of Professional Conduct.96 The
Parliament created a statutory privilege for patent agents in 1968,
which has since been repealed but remains in a different form in the
Patents Act.97 Generally, U.S. courts have given recognition to Brit-
ish patent agent privilege under the principle of comity.98
91. See Benrishiho, supra note 74, art. 22.
92. But see Spero, supra note 74, at 105-06. Spero describes benrishi as clerks who
do little more than translate and file papers, and encourages American corporations
seeking patent protection in Japan to hire technically competent and bilingual
bengoshi to prosecute the applications. Id As Spero himself admits, however, finding
such a bengoshi is prohibitively difficult and expensive. I Moreover, his description
of benrishi's responsibilities and abilities are unsubstantiated.
93. CIPA: The Chartered Institute of Patent Agents (last modified Jan. 16, 1997)
<http://www.cipa.org.uk/cipa/agents.htm>.
94. Id
95. Id
96. Id
97. The Civil Evidence Act of 1968, 1968 ch. 64, § 15(1). The provision was re-
pealed by the Patents Act of 1977, 17 Halsbury's Statutes of England 187 (4th ed.
1993), and became section 104 of the Patents Act of 1977. 1977 ch. 37, § 104. Section
104 of the Patents Act of 1977 was in turn repealed in the Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act of 1988, 1988 ch. 48, § 303(2), sched. 8. Under the current Patents Act,
section 103 provides for an explicit privilege for communications with solicitors relat-
ing to patent proceedings, 33 Halsbury's Statutes of England 246 (4th ed. 1993), and
section 102A, enacted in the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1988, states that
"[a] registered patent agent... may do, in or in connection with proceedings on an
appeal under this Act from the comptroller to the Patents Court, anything which a
solicitor of the Supreme Court might do, other than prepare a deed." Id at 245. Thus,
despite the repeal of section 15 of the Civil Evidence Act, England continues to have
a statutory patent agent privilege. See also 13 Halsbury's Laws of England (4th ed.
1975) § 72 n.9, at 57-58.
98. See, e.g., Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 298, 306-
307 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377, 391 (D.D.C.
1978). But see Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1170-71
(D.S.C. 1974) (denying privilege to communications predating the passage of the
statute).
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C. Europe
The European Patent Office ("EPO") was established under the
European Patent Convention in 1977 to provide a single source for
patent protection in Europe.9 There are currently eighteen con-
tracting states: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Ger-
many, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the
United Kingdom.100 An applicant may file a patent application in the
EPO in either English, French, or German and, once granted, the pat-
ent is valid in as many contracting countries as the applicant wishes to
designate. 1°1
Patent representatives qualified to prosecute patent applications
before the EPO are called European Patent Attorneys.yn2 To be eligi-
ble to take the European Patent Attorney qualifying examination,
candidates must complete three years of supervised practical training
in either a patent representative office or in a corporate patent depart-
ment.10 3 Furthermore, candidates must possess a technical or scien-
tific qualification from an accredited institution.'0 4 Provided that
these threshold requirements are met, candidates must pass a four-
part examination. 05 Part A tests the candidate's ability to draft
claims; part B requires the candidate to reply to a patent office action;
part C involves the drafting of an opposition against a patent applica-
tion; and part D requires candidates to make legal assessments of par-
ticular questions.0 6 According to one study, the passage rate
fluctuates between 36% and 66%. 107
Upon passing the examination, a candidate must request that his or
her name be included on the List of Professional Representatives.les
By registering, the candidate becomes a member of the Institute of
Professional Representatives before the EPO ("EPI"), and is quali-
fied to practice before the EPO. As a member, a European Patent
99. See Introduction to Intellectual Property and Practice 511 (World ntellectual
Property Organization ed., 1997); How to Become a European Patent Attorney (visited
Aug. 5, 1997) file downloaded from <http'/www.Austria.EU.net/epolepi/education>.
100. How to Become a European Patent Attorney, supra note 99.
101. Introduction to Intellectual Property and Practice, supra note 99, at 512.
102. How to Become a European Patent Attorney, supra note 99.
103. Id.
104. Id
105. Id. This requirement is waived for patent agents who were already registered
in one of the contracting states at the time that the state joined the EPO system. See
Kopacz, supra note 49, at 50. Most practicing European patent attorneys were admit-
ted through this "grandfather clause" and, as of 1987, only 4% had taken the exami-
nation. Id. at 49-50.
106. How to Become a European Patent Attorney, supra note 99. But see Kopacz,
supra note 49, at 51 ("[Vlirtually all patent attorneys in Europe have only a technical
or scientific background and, with rare exceptions, have no legal training and are not
members of the bar.").
107. Kopacz, supra note 49, at 57-58.
108. How to Become a European Patent Attorney, supra note 99.
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Attorney is subject to EPI's disciplinary rules, including Article 2 on
professional secrecy. 1°9 The rule provides: "A professional represen-
tative shall be bound not to disclose information accepted by him in
confidence in the exercise of his duties, unless he is released from this
obligation."" 0
In cases where privilege issues have arisen in relation to European
Patent Attorneys, however, U.S. courts have turned to the privilege
law of the patent attorney's country of practice rather than the Euro-
pean standard."' Courts examining the privilege law of individual
European countries generally tend to find that privilege laws cover
patent agents in their respective countries. For example, in Duplan
Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.," 2 the court recognized privilege for
communications with a French patent agent based on a provision in
the French Penal Code." 3 Similarly, in Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Lee
Apparel Co.,"' the court extended attorney-client privilege to Ger-
man patent agents based on an affidavit by a German patent attorney
stating that patent attorneys may appear in court but only with an
attorney-at-law, and that German law prohibits patent attorneys from
disclosing communications with clients." 5
109. Regulation on Discipline for Professional Representatives, art. 2 (1973) (visited
Aug. 5, 1997) file downloaded from <http'//www.Austria.EU.net/epo/epi/rules>.
110. Id.
111. See, e.g., Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics Orthopedics, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 298, 306-
07 (E.D.N.Y. 1992) (analyzing British law for communication concerning a European
patent application).
112. 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974).
113. Id. at 1170. The court pointed to Article 378 of the French Penal Code, which
reads:
Doctors, surgeons and other health officers, as well as chemists, midwives
and all other persons who are depositories, by their condition or profession
or by temporary or permanent duties, of secrets which are entrusted to
them, who, except in cases where the law obliges or authorizes them to be
informers, shall have revealed such secrets, shall be punished by imprison-
ment of one month to six months and by a fine of 500 to 3,000 francs.
Id. (alteration in published opinion omitted).
114. 143 F.R.D. 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
115. Id. at 524. The court cited to various German statutes, including section 203 of
the Penal Code, section 24 of the Guidelines for the Practicing of the Patent Attorney
Profession, and sections 53 (misprinted in the published opinion as "§ 383") and 97 of
the Criminal Procedure Code. Id. at 524 n.6. Penal Code section 203(3), governing
violations of privacy, provides that certain professionals including patent attorneys
who "without authorization, reveals another's secret... shall be punished by up to
one year's imprisonment or by fine." § 203(1) Nr.3 Strafgesetzbuch [StGB], translated
in The Penal Code of the Federal Republic of Germany (Joseph J. Darby trans.,
1987). Under section 53 of the Criminal Procedure Code, "attorneys-at-law, patent
attorneys, notaries, sworn accountants, sworn auditors, tax advisers and authorized
tax agents, physicians, dentists, pharmacists, and midwives, as regards whatever has
been confided or became known to them in this capacity" may refuse to testify. § 53
Nr.I(3) Strafprozegordnung [StPO], translated in The German Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure (Horst Niebler trans., 1965). Section 97 excludes from seizure "written com-
munications between the accused and persons who may refuse testimony pursuant to
... § 53" as well as "notes, made by persons specified in § 53... concerning informa-
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i'. APPLICATION OF THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE TO
FOREIGN LEGAL PROFESSIONALS
In most of the reported cases, privilege becomes an issue when an
accused patent infringer seeks discovery of communications concern-
ing foreign patent applications that correspond to the patent-in-suit.' 1 6
The plaintiff is sometimes the accused infringer, moving to invalidate
or limit the claims of the patent at issue.'" 7 An accused infringer
hopes that such communications include admissions, or statements
showing inequitable conduct, fraud on the patent office, or bad
faith."1 8 A party seeking a patent may have confided to a foreign pat-
ent representative its concern that the claims of its American patent
were overbroad and unlikely to be granted in other countries. A party
may have revealed that it discovered potentially invalidating prior
art." 9 Less common are cases where a plaintiff patent-holder de-
mands disclosure of communications between the accused infringer
and a foreign patent attorney.' This may occur when, for example, a
foreign defendant seeks advice from its long-time, local patent counsel
upon learning of the patent-in-suit or a corresponding patent applica-
tion."l In any of the scenarios described above, the nature and the
substance of the communication go beyond the mere processing of
patent applications and indicate that the parties assumed that a privi-
lege existed.' 2
tion confided to them by the accused, or concerning other circumstances to which
their right to refuse testimony pertains." § 97 Nr. I(1)-(2) StPO.
116. See, e.g., Golden Trade, 143 F.RID. at 517. To obtain protection worldwide, an
inventor cannot just file a patent application in only one country, but must file in
patent offices around the world. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 22-23. The first application
to be filed is called the "priority application," and most countries require that the
corresponding application be filed within one year of the date on which the priority
application was filed. Id.
117. This may occur, for example, in the context of an antitrust suit between patent
licensees and their licenser. See, e.g., In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litig., 81 F.R.D. 377
(D.D.C. 1978). A party threatened with a potential infringement claim may seek a
declaratory judgment from a court that a patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not in-
fringed. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 35-36.
118. Such arguments, if proven, could defeat the patentholder's liability claims by
rendering the entire patent unenforceable. Schwartz, supra note 4, at 89-90.
119. "Prior art" refers to publicly disclosed material predating the claimed inven-
tion. Id. at 60-61.
120. See, e.g., Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., No. 86 Civ. 1749, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 3129 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1992).
121. Foreign patent offices publish pending patent applications prior to examina-
tion, in contrast to the United States where the contents of a patent application re-
main secret until granting. See Paul A. Ragusa, Note, Eighteen Months to Publication:
Should the United States Join Europe and Japan by Promptly Publishing Patent Appli-
cations?, 26 Geo. Wash. J. Int'l L. & Econ. 143, 150-52 (1992). As a consequence,
foreign patent applications based on an American priority application are often pub-
lished before the American patent issues. Id. Thus, a party could learn of its competi-
tors' newest inventions long before their patents issue. Id.
122. 1 Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 139(2) cmt. at 388 ("[T]he fact that
the communication was of a sort treated in strict confidence... was presumably a
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In deciding whether to recognize a privilege for foreign patent
agents and other types of legal professionals, a majority of courts-
with some important exceptions'-have turned to a conflict of laws
analysis.'" The exact nature of that conflict of laws analysis, however,
has not been analyzed by courts or scholars in sufficient detail.
As noted previously," proposed evidence rule 503(a)(2) tried to
prevent "excursions into conflict of laws questions."' 26 This distaste
for conflict of laws is understandable given the general view that
"[c]hoice-of-law issues have always been among the most difficult
legal issues."'1 27 This field of law has spawned much academic debate,
but with little offered in the way of practical solutions. 128 Moreover,
although many approaches to resolving conflict of laws issues have
developed,
[a]ll of the existing approaches-interest analysis, the law-of-the-fo-
rum approach of the First Restatement, the most significant rela-
tionship approach of the Second Restatement, and others-fail
when applied to the attorney-client privilege. Certainty and pre-
dictability are essential if the attorney-client privilege is to serve its
purpose and none of these approaches produces a certain, predict-
able result. 29
This section reviews the various conflict of laws approaches listed
above, their relationship to attorney-client privilege in the interna-
tional context, and their application in various courts. 30
A. The "Touch Base" Approach
In Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,' 3' the first decision to
apply a conflict of laws methodology to the problem of foreign patent
agent communications, the court sought guidance in principles of
comity. 32 Under this approach, also known as "comity of nations" or
result of the existence of the privilege."). Also, under proposed rule 503 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, someone whom the client merely believed to be an attorney
may be treated as one for purposes of privilege. Fed. R. Evid. proposed rule
503(a)(2), supra note 42.
123. Discussed infra notes 244-52 and accompanying text.
124. See, e.g., Harnisch, supra note 9, at 445-46 (noting that the majority of district
courts "engage in a form of traditional choice of law analysis").
125. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
126. Fed. R. Evid. proposed rule 503(a)(2) advisory committee's notes, reprinted in
Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 42, at 309.
127. Bradford, supra note 36, at 909.
128. As one commentator noted wryly, "[t]here is a widespread belief that the con-
fficts of laws is different from all other legal disciplines in that practical results and
workability do not matter." Il at 911 n.21.
129. Id. at 912.
130. In addition, there is a fourth, "functional" approach, which does not follow a
conflict of law doctrine, but instead looks to whether the adviser is a functional
equivalent of an attorney. See infra Part IV.
131. 397 F. Supp. 1146 (D.S.C. 1974).
132. Idt at 1170.
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"international comity," a state may recognize another state or nation's
legislative, executive, or judicial acts on the basis of friendship be-
tween nations. 33 Comity is "neither a mere courtesy and good will on
the one hand, nor a matter of absolute obligation on the other
hand."134
The notion of international comity is ancient. In 1987, for example,
the Supreme Court invoked comity by citing to Emory v. Grenough135
from 1797, which quoted the 17th century Dutch scholar Ulrich Hu-
ber, and Hilton v. Guyot136 from 1895.13 Huber's formulation of
comity was that "rights acquired within the limits of a government
retain their force everywhere"'-i.e., that an individual carries her
"vested rights" wherever she travels. Justice Story embraced this rea-
soning in his Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws, 39 but with an
important exception:
["comity of nations"] is the most appropriate phrase to express the
true foundation and extent of the obligation of the laws of one na-
tion within the territories of another. It is derived altogether from
the voluntary consent of the latter, and is inadmissible, when it is
contrary to its known policy, or prejudicial to its interests.140
Thus, comity was subject to what became known as the "public policy
exception. '1 41 Although the public policy exception is arguably neces-
133. 45 Am. Jur. 2d International Law § 7 (1996).
134. 16 Am. Jur. 2d Conflict of Laws § 10 (1996) (citations omitted).
135. 3 U.S. (3 Dall) 369 (1797).
136. 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
137. Socidtd Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482
U.S. 522, 543 n27 (1987). Aerospatiale was concerned with the proper application of
the Hague Convention for Taking Evidence Abroad, a treaty which the United States,
along with fifteen European countries, signed. Although the treaty provides that a
person may refuse to give evidence insofar as he has a privilege or duty to refuse to
give the evidence, the Court stated that under the principles of comity, the Conven-
tion was only one of the factors to be considered in determining whether to recognize
a French "blocking statute." lIa at 544. Although all nine justices concurred in the
holding that the disclosure of the documents could be compelled by a U.S. court, the
Court split 5-4 over the majority's view that comity required a case-by-case approach,
and that the Convention's provisions may be overridden if a district court determined
that they contravened the forum state's policy. Id at 548. The minority expressed
doubts about the ability of a district court to adjudicate a foreign government's inter-
ests without local bias. I While the case makes clear that comity remains a viable
principle in matters relating to international law, the majority opinion leaves unclear
what factors to consider in a comity analysis, beyond the basic outlines provided by
Ulrich Huber in the 17th century and Justice Story in the 19th century.
138. 2 Ulrich Huber, Praelectiones Juris Romani et Hodierni, bk I tit. iii (De Con-
flictu Legum Diversarum in Diversis Imperiis) (1689), quoted in Roger C. Cramton et
al, Conflict of Laws 3 (5th ed. 1993). For a discussion of the history of comity, see
Hessel E. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1966).
139. J. Story, Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws (7th ed. 1872).
140. See id. § 38 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
141. Holly Sprague, Comment, Choice of Law: A Fond Farewell to Comity and
Public Policy, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1447, 1447 (1986).
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sary to prevent potentially absurd judgments, 42 the exception is self-
defeating because a judge is always free to offer some domestic policy
that is offended by the foreign law.143 As one commentator has criti-
cized, "comity and the public policy exception rationales... lack both
analytical structure and standards for determining when and how they
should be applied."' 14 The result is that a court can always apply the
law of the forum state regardless of any foreign interest, however
important. 4
5
The Duplan court employed the principle of international comity to
analyze communications with British and French patent agents over
which the plaintiff patent-holder asserted attorney-client privilege. 46
Despite Sperry's recognition that patent agents engage in the practice
of law, 47 the court held that "no communications from patent agents,
whether American or foreign, are subject to an attorney-client privi-
lege in the United States."'14 According to the court, these foreign
privileges contravened United States policy in promoting discovery,
and thus would not be recognized if the communication "touched
base" with the United States:
The federal rules are designed to promote discovery whereas these
two foreign statutes necessarily restrict discovery. It is thoroughly
established that comity will not be extended to foreign law or rights
based thereon if it opposes settled public policy of the forum nation.
Therefore any communications touching base with the United
States will be governed by the federal discovery rules ....
On the other hand, the court reasoned that communications regarding
matters relating solely to a foreign country should be governed by the
142. See id. at 1449.
143. See Bradford, supra note 36, at 918 ("Courts adopting [comity of nations] have
set forth no guidelines for deciding when forum public policy is strong enough to
trump the otherwise applicable rule and when it is not."); see also Laker Airways, Ltd.
v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Starr, J., dis-
senting) (criticizing comity as "open-ended").
144. Sprague, supra note 141, at 1447.
145. See Soci~t6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court,
482 U.S. 522, 553 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
The Aerospatiale minority also warned that the raw exercise of discovery orders by
United States courts may ultimately harm U.S. interests in the form of reprisals. Id. at
568. An example of how U.S. interests could be harmed by foreign judgments is Case
155/79, AM&S Europe Ltd. v. Commission, 1982 E.C.R. 1575, in which the Court of
Justice of the European Communities held that privilege extends only to independent
attorneys, and not in-house counsel. Id. at 1611-12. For discussions of the problems
raised by the case, see Mary C. Daly, The Culturai Ethical, and Legal Challenges in
Lawyering for a Global Organization: The Role of the General Counsel, _ Emory
LJ. - (forthcoming 1997) (copy on file with author), Roger J. Goebel, Professional
Qualifications and Educational Requirements for Law Practice in a Foreign Country:
Bridging the Cultural Gap, 63 Til. L. Rev. 443, 503-06 (1989), and Hill, supra note 11.
146. Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1169 (D.S.C. 1974).
147. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
148. Duplan, 397 F. Supp. at 1169 (emphasis added).
149. Id (citation omitted).
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"applicable foreign statute" on the basis of comity. °50 The court thus
turned to British and French law and noted that, in the respective
countries, British and French law provided a "cloak" of privilege over
communications with patent agents.'51 Based on this "touch base"
analysis,' the court held that the comity-based application of foreign
privilege laws protects communications with French and British patent
agents that did not "touch base" with the United States. 53
Despite these guidelines, the Duplan court did not clarify what
"touching base" entailed, nor did the later courts that followed its rea-
soning. In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation,"s a consolidated anti-
trust case in which the plaintiff licensees sought documents relating to
foreign patent filings by the defendant,15 5 presented a similar situa-
tion. Judge Richey of the District of Columbia Circuit applied
Duplan's "touch base" analysis but arrived at the opposite conclusion,
recognizing a privilege for a British patent agent.'-a Regarding com-
munications between defendant Beecham and British patent agent
Smither, the discovery master specifically followed the United Shoe
definition of attorney-client privilege, which requires that the adviser
be a "member of a bar of a court":157
For the privilege to attach, not only must the client's adviser be act-
ing as an attorney, but he must be an attorney, admitted to the bar.
Regardless of his training and function and the nature of the advice
he renders, Mr. Smither is not a member of the bar of any court.'58
Upon objection by the defendant, Judge Richey modified the Special
Master's ruling.15 9 Unlike Duplan, the court came in line with Sperry
and held that, under United States law, patent agent-client communi-
cations are covered by attorney-client privilege, if the patent agent is
registered with the USPTO. 16 Based on statutory requirements for
patent agents registered with the USPTO, such as having full and
working knowledge of patent law and being governed by the same
ethical standards as attorneys, the court found that "in appearance
and fact, the registered patent agent stands on the same footing as an
attorney in proceedings before the Patent Office." 161 Thus, the court
implied from the USPTO registration requirements a congressional
150. Id. at 1170.
151. Id. at 1169. For a discussion of the British and French laws, see supra notes 97,
113.
152. As characterized by the court in Bayer AG v. Barr Labs., Inc., 33 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1655, 1658 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
153. 397 F. Supp. at 1170-71.
154. 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978).
155. Id. at 380, 391.
156. Id. at 391.
157. Discussed supra note 23.
158. 81 F.R.D. at 391 (quoting Special Master's report).
159. Id.
160. Id. at 392-94.
161. Id. at 393.
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intent to extend the privilege to patent agents.' 62 The Ampicillin
court's emphasis on registration with the USPTO meant that when
foreign communications concerned patent activities in the United
States, they would be governed by the American privilege rule-that
is, the patent agent, whether foreign or domestic, must be registered
in the USPTO.1 6 3 On the other hand, when foreign communications
did not "touch base" with the United States, the communications
would be given a privilege to the extent that foreign law affords a
privilege protection."6
B. The Bright Line Approach
Some courts rejected the comity approach, instead following a
"bright line" rule articulated by Judge Gershon in Status Time Corp. v.
Sharp Electronics Corp.'65  Under this rule, foreign non-lawyers
would not be allowed to assert privilege regardless of the privilege law
of the United States or of a foreign country. 66 Although the same
court eventually rejected the Status Time analysis, 67 Judge Gershon's
decision was highly influential in the period immediately following its
issuance. Judges lauded the opinion as "singularly erudite"'168 and
"seminal.' 1 69 Following Status Time, magistrate judges refused to rec-
ognize privilege for foreign patent agents in Novamont North
America, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co. 170 and Revlon, Inc. v. Carson
162. Id.
163. 1& at 391, 394. The registration requirement resolves the conundrum of a for-
eign patent agent who participates in a communication that "touches base" with the
United States. It is worth comparing the Ampicillin court's analysis with that of the
Delaware District Court in Renfield Corp. v. E. Remy Martin & Co., S.A., 98 F.R.D.
442 (D. Del. 1982). The Renfield court held that the attorney-client privilege pro-
tected communications with French in-house counsel concerning U.S. law, even
though the French counsel would likely not have enjoyed a privilege in France and
were not qualified to advise on U.S. law. Id at 444-45. The court found, without
discussion, that the United States had the most significant relationship with the com-
munications and, therefore, applied the federal privilege rule, which protected com-
munications with in-house counsel. I& at 445. The French counsels' lack of
qualification to advise on U.S. law was not relevant to the privilege analysis. Id. at 444
n.6. Moreover, the fact that the French counsel were not members of a bar was secon-
dary to their functional equivalency to a lawyer. Id. at 444.
164. 81 F.R.D. at 391. This rule has been presented as the black letter law in some
texts. See, e.g., Paul R. Rice, Attorney Client Privilege in the United States 125-26
(1993).
165. 95 F.R.D. 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
166. I& at 33.
167. Golden Trade S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 519 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.
1992) (discussed infra Part III.C).
168. Revlon, Inc. v. Carson Prods. Co., 37 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 325, 327
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).
169. Novamont N. Am., Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., No. 91 Civ. 6482, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 6622, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 1992).
170. No. 91 Civ. 6482, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6622, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 1992).
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Products Co.'7 1 In Duttle v. Bandler & Kass"7 the court applied the
bright line rule outside of the patent context and rejected an assertion
of privilege covering German tax specialists.'73
The Status Time court recognized that Sperry changed the tradi-
tional rule regarding communications relating to patent applications,
but only to the extent that such communications were with patent at-
torneys who were members of a bar.174 The court specifically refused
to allow the same privilege to be extended to foreign patent practi-
tioners.175 In Status Time, the defendant sought the production of
documents relating to plaintiff patent-holder's foreign patent applica-
tions.176 The court asserted that Duplan was "inapposite to the facts
at bar" on the basis that Duplan recognized foreign privilege for com-
munications that related solely to a foreign patent application.'" The
court also considered cases such as Ampicillin to be unconvincing.178
The court turned to the principle that attorney-client privilege should
be narrowly construed:
Some measure of confidence may be appropriate between a client
and a foreign patent agent just as it might be appropriate... be-
tween a client and his accountant, or for that matter, between a cli-
ent and his banker or his investment adviser. However, the
necessity for "unrestricted and unbounded confidence" between a
client and his attorney which justifies the uniquely restrictive attor-
ney-client privilege simply does not exist in the other
relationships. 179
As one commentator has noted, the court "failed to explain why the
relationship between a client and a patent agent is more akin to that
of an accountant than an attorney."'" In that respect, the decision
may be faulty because it is based on an erroneous view of a patent
agent's work.
In Novamont North America, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co.,1'8 the de-
fendants withheld communications between their American and Swiss
171. 37 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1983). Ultimately, the pat-
ents belonging to the defendant who was asserting the privilege were found to be
invalid by Judge Cooper in Revlor Inc v. Carson Prods. Co., 602 F. Supp. 1071
(S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd in part and rev'd in part (on other grounds), 803 F.2d 676 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
172. 127 F.R.D. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
173. Id. at 52.
174. 95 F.RD. 27, 29, 31 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (citing the United Shoe standard, dis-
cussed supra note 23).
175. Id. at 32-33.
176. Id. at 28.
177. Id. at 32. This distinction is questionable, because the opinion indicates that
the communications over which privilege was asserted also related to foreign patent
applications. Id. at 28.
178. Id. at 33.
179. Id
180. Harnisch, supra note 9, at 443-44.
181. No. 91 Civ. 6482, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6622 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 1992).
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attorneys and patent agents in fifteen countries. 1' The communica-
tions related to the foreign patent application prosecutions of the de-
fendants' American patent, which was the subject matter of the
lawsuit. 183 The magistrate judge characterized as virtually unanimous
the view that communications with foreign patent agents are not pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege, 18' dismissing the Duplan line of
cases as outdated. 85 The judge further attempted to distinguish the
Duplan line of cases by asserting that, in this instance, the federal
common law of privileges should govern under Rule 501 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence.' 86 This distinction arguably fails, however, be-
cause the federal common law of privileges may have likewise
governed the earlier cases. Furthermore, the categorical statement
that federal common law "does not recognize the attorney-client privi-
lege for communications between clients and non-attorneys" simply
ignores the considerable body of law to the contrary. 87 Moreover,
the earlier cases, like Novamont, involved communications about for-
eign patent applications that corresponded to the United States pat-
ent-in-suit, and the purpose of requesting discovery of the patent
agent communications was to invalidate the patent-in-suit. The
court's implication that such factors somehow make the United States
the nation with the "most significant interest" seems far-fetched. If
that were truly so, the comity principle would be meaningless, because
the forum court could say that any issue that came before it implicates
a significant policy of that forum. The Novamont court's position that
"[e]xpansion of the attorney-client privilege on the basis of comity
would frustrate important principles of our jurisprudence which disfa-
vor testamentary exclusionary principles... because they inhibit the
truth-seeking process"' 88 is simply not supported by the history of the
attorney-client privilege.' 89 Federal courts have long recognized such
a privilege without resorting to comity-showing that, under federal
common law, there are principles that are at least as important as the
truth-seeking process, if not more so.
C. "Touch Base" Redux
Status Time's challenge against Duplan and Ampicillin's comity re-
gime was in turn criticized and rejected in Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Lee
Apparel Co.' 90 Golden Trade, in reasserting Duplan's "touch base"
182. Id. at *2.
183. IL
184. Id. at *3.
185. Id. at *4.
186. Id at *6.
187. See supra note 66.
188. 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6622 at *6.
189. See discussion supra Part I.
190. 143 F.R.D. 514, 519 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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principle, attempted to reformulate its rationale under the more mod-
em reasoning of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws.19
The Second Restatement, estimated to be followed in fourteen
states192 but much maligned by scholars, 9 3 contains a specific provi-
sion for privilege conflicts. 194 Subsection 139(2) suggests that when
the state with the "most significant relationship with the communica-
tion" recognizes a privilege not recognized by the forum state, the
communication should be disclosed under the policy of the forum
state unless the foreign state's interest overrides. 95 The Second Re-
statement, however, is flawed generally in that its notion of "most sig-
nificant relationship" is ill-defined.96 Moreover, its method for
weighing the non-forum state's interest is unclear.'19 The comment to
subsection 139(2) lays out broad factors to be considered in the analy-
sis, including: (1) the number and nature of the contacts that the fo-
rum state has with the parties and the transaction involved; (2) the
relative materiality of the evidence that is sought to be excluded; (3)
the kind of privilege involved; and (4) fairness to the parties. 198 In
191. The Golden Trade court does not explicitly state that it is following the Second
Restatement, but this is apparent from the court's reasoning. See infra notes 205-08
and accompanying text.
192. Herma Hill Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 Mercer
L. Rev. 521, 556-57, 591-92 (1983).
193. See id. at 552-56,558-62; Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in the American Courts
in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and Developments, 39 Am. J. Comp. L 465,
486-87 (1991) ("[O]ne needs to read a lot of opinions in a single sitting fully to appre-
ciate just how badly the Second Restatement works in practice.").
194. 1 Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 139(2). In contrast, the First Re-
statement, which remains the conflicts law in at least sixteen states and the District of
Columbia, Kay, supra note 192, at 582, 591-92, does not have a specific rule for privi-
lege conflicts. The First Restatement embodies a traditional approach to conflict of
laws based on the principle of lex locus (law of the place). Sprague, supra note 141, at
1448-49. A court following the First Restatement would likely determine the applica-
ble privilege law depending on whether it considers privilege to be substantive or
procedural. See Bradford, supra note 36, at 916-17. On the principle that admissibility
of evidence is procedural, such a court would likely decide that the rule should be
governed by the law of the forum state. Se4 e.g., Cervantes v. Tune Inc., 464 F.2d 986,
989 n.5 (8th Cir. 1972) (applying law of the forum state, Missouri, to a question of a
reporter's privilege not to disclose news sources); Union Planters Nat'l Bank of Mem-
phis v. ABC Records, Inc., 82 F.R.D. 472, 474 (W.D. Tenn. 1979) (stating that "the
Tennessee courts ... would hold that in the present situation the attorney-client privi-
lege is a question of evidence, and that in determining the scope and validity of the
privilege the law of Tennessee would govern"). One problem with this extremely
rigid approach is that it completely ignores the reasons for privileging certain types of
communications. At the time that a communication is taking place, the forum of a
potential future dispute is impossible to predict, especially in the international
context.
195. 1 Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 139(2).
196. See Bradford, supra note 36, at 938-39; see also Kramer, supra note 193, at 467
(calling the Second Restatement "rudderless").
197. Bradford, supra note 36, at 940.
198. 1 Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 139(2) cmt. at 387. These factors
track those listed in § 6 of the Second Restatement to determine the "most significant
relationship." Id. at 10.
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cases where the contacts with the forum state are few and insignifi-
cant, the comment suggests that the state with the greatest interest in
having the evidence excluded should prevail.199 Also, a court may be
more likely to give effect to a foreign privilege that is generally similar
to a privilege found in its local law.2" The comment further explains
that a court may be inclined to recognize a foreign privilege if it was
relied upon, even if the parties were not actually aware of such a privi-
lege.2° 1 The awareness alone that "communications of the sort in-
volved are treated in strict confidence in the state of the most
significant relationship" may be sufficient. 2"
The Second Restatement approach was used in Golden Trade,
where the defendants moved for production of documents relating to
communications between foreign patent agents and the exclusive li-
censee of the U.S. patent-in-suit, who handled the prosecution of for-
eign patent applications. °3 Judge Dolinger, unlike Judge Gershon in
Status Time, gave weight to the foreign interests at stake: "This issue
is significant because many foreign countries treat their patent agents
as the functional equivalent of an attorney and recognize what
amounts to an attorney-client privilege for his communications with
his clients.' 2°  The court, after carefully examining the range of ap-
199. Id. at 387.
200. Id. at 388.
201. Id.
202. IL In spite of these comments, the practical impact of the rule is to givejudges broad discretion, ultimately providing the same "law of the forum" result as
comity and the First Restatement approaches. Other conflict of laws approaches are
also not particularly helpful. Under the "Governmental Interest Analysis" approach
advanced by Brainerd Currie in the 1950's, an inquiry is made into whether a "true
conflict"-i.e. a situation in which one state's interest is defeated while another state's
interest is advanced-exists. See Sprague, supra note 141, at 1455. Where there is a
true conflict, Currie advises following the forum law; where there is a false conflict,
the law of the state whose interest would be harmed unless followed prevails. Id. This
approach avoids the unpredictability inherent in weighing of interests by judges. In
actual application, however, courts faced with true conflicts have turned to the doc-
trine of "comparative impairment," under which the court determines which state's
interest would be more greatly impaired if its law was not applied. Id. It goes without
saying that the comparative impairment doctrine is to Interest Analysis what the pub-
lic policy exception is to comity-they are both prone to inconsistency and unpredict-
ability. Another theory is Robert Leflar's "better law" approach, under which a court
may apply what it determines to be the "better rule of law" among other choice-
influencing considerations. Id. at 1454. Such an approach would exacerbate the
problems rather than solving it.
One commentator has criticized existing conflict of laws approaches as inconsistent
with the purposes of privilege, and suggests that a territorial approach based on either
the attorney's state of practice or the client's domicile would offer more consistency
and predictability. Bradford, supra note 36, at 948-49. According to this view, open
communications between attorneys and clients will be encouraged only if the parties
can be certain that future courts will respect privilege as the parties understood it at
the time that the communication occurred. See infra note 234 and accompanying text.
203. 143 F.R.D. 514, 516-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)
204. Id. at 519. This statement indicates that the court was sensitive to the concerns
addressed by the functional approach. See infra Part IV.B.
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proaches, returned to Duplan's "touch base" approach, but with a
choice of law analysis that looks towards the state with the "most di-
rect and compelling interest. '20 -5 This approach, although unidentified
by the court, is that of the Second Restatement. 0 6 Though the court
does not make this distinction, the analysis differs from Duplan's
"touch base" test20 7 in that it balances the interests of the relevant
states under the "most compelling interest" rubric. Using this analy-
sis, the court turned to Norwegian, German, and Israeli law and found
a privilege for foreign patent attorneys.208
In Bayer AG v. Barr Laboratories Inc.,2°9 the court-appointed Spe-
cial Master likewise rejected Status 7ime's bright line approach and
followed Golden Trade's version of the "touch base" test. 210 The Spe-
cial Master, however, developed and applied his own version of the
test:
[C]ommunications with foreign patent attorneys or patent agents
that concern legal advice are privileged under the following
circumstances:
[1.] the subject matter of the communication primarily involves for-
eign law and the attorney-client privilege both exists in the country
concerned and extends to patent agents/attorneys...
[2.] the subject matter of the communication primarily involves
American law and the foreign patent agent or patent attorney was
licensed with the U.S. Patent Office or a foreign equivalent ....
[and]
[3.] the subject matter of the communication primarily involves
American law and the foreign patent agent was not licensed but was
functioning as the agent or client of an attorney...
Based on this test, the Special Master concluded that communications
with Japanese patent agents were protected by the privilege. 12 Upon
objection by the plaintiff, the court reviewed the master's approach
and criticized it as "almost mechanical" and not based on proper con-
flict of laws principles.213 The court rearticulated the "touch base"
rule as a test based on the Second Restatement approach,214 in-
structing the Special Master
205. Id. at 521.
206. See supra notes 192-200 and accompanying text.
207. See supra notes 149-64 and accompanying text.
208. 143 F.R.D. at 522-24. In determining German law, the judge cited to several
German laws, including the Penal Code, the Criminal Proceedings Code, and the
Guidelines for the Practicing of the Patent Attorney Profession. I at 524 n.6. For a
discussion of these laws, see supra Part IILC.
209. 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1655 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
210. Id. at 1658.
211. Id. (alterations and omissions in original).
212. Id. at 1660.
213. Id. at 1659.
214. Arguably, the Bayer court's recommendation points to the "center of gravity"
approach used by the New York Court of Appeals. Kay, supra note 192, at 527. This
approach, which has been criticized for its unpredictability and its tendency to cause
1997]
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to make a threshold determination as to what consequences apply-
ing foreign privilege law under the facts before him would have
upon U.S. policy. We further instruct that in determining which for-
eign law ought to be applied to a particular communication consid-
eration be given to the country in which the patent agent-client
relationship began or was centered at the time the purportedly priv-
ileged communication was sent.215
Golden Trade's "touch base" test is now the prevailing rule in the
Southern District of New York and elsewhere. 16
IV. SEEKING SOLUTIONS BEYOND THE CoNFLiCr OF LAWS
REGIME: THE FUNCTIONAL APPROACH
As Part III demonstrated, the current body of law concerning for-
eign patent specialists is inconsistent and flawed. The following table
summarizes the inconsistencies:
unnecessary confusion, id. at 537, is generally viewed as having been incorporated
into the Second Restatement approach. Id. at 526.
215. Ia It should be noted that the court also endorsed the "more exacting stan-
dard" of Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., No. 86 Civ. 1749, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3129 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1992) (discussed infra at notes 237-41 and accompany-
ing text). In Alpex, the court did not find the language of Japan's Code of Civil Proce-
dure, quoted supra note 88, to be sufficient to cover "the patent agent's client or...
the documents prepared in connection with the patent agent's advice." 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3129, at *6. The Bayer court's attempt to reconcile Alpex (which did not rec-
ognize the privilege for Japanese benrishi) and Golden Trade (which recognized the
privilege for German patent agents), 33 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1660 n.6, fails because the lan-
guage of the German laws cited in Golden Trade provides no more protection than
does Japanese law. See supra notes 76, 115 (discussing German statutes).
216. See, e.g., Odone v. Croda Int'l PLC, 950 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1997); Saxholm
AS v. Dynal, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 331 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Bayer AG v. Barr Labs. Inc., 33
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1655 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
The Eastern District of New York, prior to settling on the Golden Trade test in
Saxholm, 164 F.R.D. at 337, dealt with the same issue in Stryker Corp. v. Intermedics
Orthopedics, Inc., 145 F.R.D. 298 (E.D.N.Y. 1992). There, a magistrate judge fol-
lowed Duplan and Ampicillin's "touch base" analysis in spite of his expressed discom-
fort at applying the British patent agent privilege, which he saw as conflating regular
privilege with work-product immunity. lId at 306 n.4. His preferred approach was to
recognize privilege for the British patent agent as the American attorney's agent. Id.
Because the communication concerned a British patent application, however, and did
not "touch base" with the United States, the judge felt constrained to turn to British
law, and concluded that its privilege should be recognized on the basis of comity. Id.
at 306-307. The magistrate judge's analysis and review of the relevant case law, how-
ever, is flawed for several reasons. First, if the patent agent was indeed acting as an
agent of a lawyer, the magistrate did not need to reach the question of whether the
communication "touched base" with the United States. See Mitts & Merrill, Inc. v.
Shred Pax Corp., 112 F.R.D. 349, 352 (N.D. IlM. 1986); see also supra note 46 (discuss-
ing the Kovel privilege). Also, the magistrate misconstrued the relevant case law, for
example describing Status Time as using the "touch base" analysis. See 145 F.R.D. at
305 n.3.
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TABLE 1
Attorney-Client Attorney-Client
Privilege Covers Privilege Covers
Cases U.S. Patent Agents Foreign Patent Agents
Duplan217  NO YES, if the communication
(Comity approach) does not touch base with
the U.S. and a privilege
exists in the foreign country
NO, if the communication
touches base with the U.S.
or a privilege does not exist
in the foreign country
Ampicilin2 l8  YES YES, if the communication
(Post-Sperry comity does not touch base with
approach) the U.S. and a privilege
exists in the foreign country
NO, if the communication
touches base with the U.S.
or a privilege does not exist
in the foreign country
Status Tne2 1 9  NO NO
(bright line approach)
Golden Trade220  NO22 1  YES, if a privilege exists in
(Second Restatement the country with the most
approach) significant interest in the
communication
NO, if the communication
touches base with the U.S.
or a privilege does not exist
in the foreign country
To resolve these inconsistencies, this part analyzes the inadequacy of
the existing conflict of laws approaches, and turns to the functional
approach, which has been employed by some courts. The functional
approach, however, lacks definitive standards. Thus, this section pro-
poses a modified or "tempered" functional approach. This approach
will prevent the analysis from becoming mired in the same problems
of inconsistency and unpredictability that plague the existing
approaches.
217. See supra notes 131-49 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 154-64 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 165-80 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 190-208 and accompanying text.
221. It should be noted, however, that the Golden Trade opinion is deeply
ambivalent on the question of whether domestic patent agents are entitled to the
privilege. See 143 F.R.D. 514, 519 n.3 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Moreover, the court stated
that recognizing such a privilege "would not be dramatically inconsistent with the
rationale underlying the attorney-client privilege." Id. at 522.
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A. The Inadequacy of the Existing Approaches
While it is clear that the choice-of-law approach suggested by
Duplan and modified by Golden Trade has become the prevailing ap-
proach over the years,' the problems inherent in the rudderless ap-
plication of its "touch base" test remain unresolved. A recent case
highlighted these problems. In Odone v. Croda International PLC,' 3
plaintiff Odone moved to compel production of correspondence be-
tween the British defendant and its British patent agent.- 4 This cor-
respondence purportedly discussed whether to name Odone as an
inventor in the defendant's British patent application.- 5 The District
of Columbia District Court, claiming to follow Golden Trade, con-
cluded that it would be "nonsensical" to find that the issue did not
touch base with the United States because the would-be inventor-if
his claim prevailed-was American, and the British patent application
later became the priority application for the United States patent. 6
The court concluded that United States law would therefore apply,
and held that no privilege existed because the defendant failed to ar-
gue that the communication would be covered by a United States
privilege rather than a British one. 7 In dicta, the court stated that
the British privilege, even if it applied, would contravene United
States public policy favoring open disclosure.- 8
Odone represents a particularly cynical and result-oriented use of
the "touch base" test. The asserted connections between the commu-
nications and the United States were extremely attenuated, because
an inventor's nationality matters little in the prosecution of patents,
and the United States is just one of many countries where a foreign
inventor may file for a patent claiming a priority date based on the
first application. Moreover, a communication between a British client
222. A survey of reported cases indicates that a majority of cases have applied a
comity analysis when faced with this question. See Odone v. Croda Int'l PLC, 950 F.
Supp. 10, 12 (D.D.C. 1997); Saxhohn Co. v. Dynal, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 331, 337
(E.D.N.Y. 1996); Glaxo, Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 148 F.R.D. 535, 538-39 (E.D.N.C.
1993); Santrade, Ltd. v. General Elec. Co., 150 F.R.D. 539, 546 (E.D.N.C. 1993); Bur-
roughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 143 F.R.D. 611, 616-17 (E.D.N.C. 1992); Wil-
lemijn Houdstermaatschaapij BV v. Apollo Computer Inc., 707 F. Supp. 1429, 1444-45
(D. Del. 1989); Medical Eng'g Corp. v. Mentor Corp., Civ. No. 4-86-937, 1987 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 8426, at *5:6 (D. Minn. Sept. 8, 1987); Eaton & Co., Inc. v. Atlantic Paste
& Glue Co., No. CV-84-4438, 1987 WL 17084, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Aug 31, 1987); Dow
Chem. Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 129, 134 n.7 (E.D. Mich.
1985); Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. National Bank of Washington, 103 F.R.D. 52, 64-
65 (D.D.C. 1984); Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 954 (N.D. Ill.
1982); Mead Digital Sys., Inc. v. A.B. Dick Co., 89 F.R.D. 318, 320-21 (S.D. Ohio
1980).
223. 950 F. Supp. 10 (D.D.C. 1997)
224. IL at 11.
225. IL
226. Id. at 13-14.
227. Id. at 14.
228. Id.
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and its British patent attorney discussing a British patent application
would not likely contain any substantive reference to United States
law. It is a testament to the weakness of the "touch base" standard
that communications that are clearly privileged under a foreign coun-
try's statutory law can be disclosed on such a basis.
The Odone court's dictum that England's statutory patent agent
privilege would contravene the American interest in open disclosure
sheds light on its contrived reasoning. The concern that recognizing
an expansion of privilege "would entail severe burdens on discovery
and create a broad 'zone of silence'"229 is also a basis for the bright
line rule. 0 As the Supreme Court reasoned in Upjohn, however,
such a concern should not automatically override the privilege 3 1 In-
deed, the Court identified the promotion of "broader public interests
in the observance of law and administration of justice" as overriding
that concern? 32 Such a policy makes little sense if it does not apply to
non-lawyer legal professionals practicing in foreign countries, because
denying protection has the effect of penalizing clients seeking profes-
sional legal advice outside of the United States. Making bar member-
ship the threshold criterion does little to promote open
communications in systems where the American concept of the bar
simply does not apply 3
If we must restrict ourselves to an approach based on conflict-of-
law principles, the use of a territorial approach to resolve these con-
fficts' 4 may best serve the policies behind the privilege. Under this
approach-which has not been applied by any court dealing with the
issue-privilege would be recognized where it can be shown that the
client or the legal adviser acted under the assumption that their com-
munications were protected from disclosure. This could be proven by
showing the existence of a privilege covering communications with the
non-lawyer adviser in either the country where the adviser is licensed
to practice or the client's domicile.?35 Thus, party expectations would
be protected and the result would be predictable at the time that the
communication takes place.
229. Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 395 (1981).
230. See supra note 188 and accompanying text.
231. Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 395.
232. Id at 389.
233. Of course, American privilege rules are not likely to impact most foreign cor-
porations, and those faced with a potential legal problem in the United States would
be well-advised to seek advice from an experienced American lawyer. The problem
addressed in this Note, in contrast, relates to communications with foreign legal pro-
fessionals that do not directly implicate the laws of the United States, at least at the
time that the communication was made.
234. See supra note 202.
235. Or, in the case of a corporation, its place of business. See Bradford, supra note
36, at 948-49. Bradford suggests that the attorney's state of registration may be the
better option, because the attorney is more likely to be aware of the privilege laws
there than those of the client's domicile. Id
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This approach, however, leads to the problem of proving foreign
law, especially where the problem relates to countries where explicit
treatment of the attorney-client privilege does not exist, at least as the
concept has developed in the United States. 36 Even under the terri-
torial approach, courts may make missteps similar to those taken in
Alpex Computer Corp. v. Nintendo Co., Ltd.,2 37 where the court de-
nied privilege protection to an infringement analysis made by
Nintendo's Japanese patent adviser.2 38 In response to Nintendo's ar-
gument that Article 281 of Japan's Civil Procedure Code" 9 prevented
such communications from disclosure, the court read the law narrowly
as a testimonial privilege covering various professionals including pat-
ent agents, and pointed to a "gap" between such a law and a client's
right to refuse to produce documents.24° The court failed to take into
account the fact that similar laws form the basis of statutory attorney-
client privilege in some American states, and the fact that courts have
traditionally interpreted such language as covering clients and docu-
ment production under modern justifications of privilege.241 Such a
narrow reading is particularly troublesome in the context of foreign
legal professionals, because the statute represents a typical formula-
tion of confidentiality rules in foreign systems? 4  Even if courts were
to follow a territorial approach, courts may still be inclined to reject
privilege for foreign legal professionals-merely under a different jus-
tification. Thus, one must seek a solution beyond the conflict of laws
regime.
B. The Functional Approach
An alternative approach may be found in cases that use a "func-
tional" analysis, which looks at whether the legal adviser was "acting
236. See Rice, supra note 164, at 122 (describing the burden on the proponent of
the privilege to establish foreign law as "often insurmontable [sic]").
237. No. 86 Civ. 1749, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3129 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 1992).
238. Id at *6-*7.
239. See supra note 88.
240. The court stated that "Nintendo has failed to offer any Japanese decisions that
have filled Article 281's 'gaps' to the extent of finding that a patent agent privilege
shields the documents held by the patent agent's client." Alpex, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 3129, at *6-*7. For a Japanese criticism of this opinion, see Akihiko Hara and
Yasunobu Sato, Beikoku no himitsu fukaiji tokken to Nippon no bengoshl/benrishi e
no sono tekiyo [Attorney-Client Privilege in the U.S. and Its Applicability to Japanese
Attorneys-at-Law and Patent Attorneys], 23 Kokusai Shoji Homu 353 (1995).
241. See, e.g., In re Young's Estate, 94 P. 731, 732 (Utah 1908) (recognizing privi-
lege as belonging exclusively to the client, in spite of statutory language that only
prohibited the attorney from disclosing client confidences); see generally McCormick,
supra note 30, at 339.
242. This is true not only for non-lawyers such as patent agents, accountants and
doctors, but for lawyers as well. See statutes discussed supra, notes 88 (Japan), 113
(France), 115 (Germany).
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as a lawyer" in an authorized capacity, and at party expectations.243
In Vernitron Medical Products, Inc. v. Baxter Laboratories, Inc., the
district court recognized privilege for documents sought by the plain-
tiff, which reflected communications with foreign patent agents.245
The court recognized that patent law is unique, with qualification
rules different from those encountered in other legal fields3246 Thus, it
rejected the formalistic distinction between a "patent attorney" and a
"patent agent" in determining privilege.247 As the court stated, "[t]he
substance of the function, rather than the label given to the individual
registered with the Patent Office, controls the determination here."2'
Vernitron's functional approach has been revived in the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois in two cases, Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co. 49 and
Heidelberg Harris, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.250 The
Vernitron court's approach is echoed outside of patent law in Renfield
Corp. v. E. Remy Martin & Co., 1 1 where the District Court of Dela-
ware extended privilege to French conseils juridique (in-house coun-
sel) by recognizing their substantive advisory work, in spite of the fact
that they were not members of a bar.252
The functional approach, in which the court's determination would
be based on whether the adviser was engaged in "the substantive
lawyering process," offers a more fair and workable solution than the
existing approaches. The approach satisfies the confidentiality needs
while being relatively predictable because the analysis would be based
on the nature of the communication itself rather than on a district
court's interpretation of foreign law. Thus, the functional test pro-
vides courts with a much more principled basis for determining privi-
lege questions. The functional approach is especially palatable in light
of the fact that each step of the predominant "touch base" approach is
243. Se4 e.g., Heidelberg Harris, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., No. 95 C
0673, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19274, at *27 (N.D. IlL Dec. 9, 1996); Mitts & Merrill,
Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 112 F.P-D. 349, 352 (N.D. MI. 1986); Mendenhall v. Barber-
Greene Co., 531 F. Supp. 951, 952-53 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Vernitron Med. Prods., Inc. v.
Baxter Labs., Inc., 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 324, 325-26 (D.NJ. 1975); see also Goebel,
supra note 145 at 505-06 & 506 n.192 (citing positively to cases recognizing privilege
for foreign patent agents based on a functional analysis).
244. 186 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 324 (D.NJ. 1975).
245. Id. at 325-26.
246. Id. at 325.
247. Id.
248. Id
249. 531 F. Supp. 951 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
250. No. 95 C 0673, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19274 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 1996). The case
is discussed infra notes 255-60 infra and accompanying text. See also Mitts & Merrill
Inc. v. Shred Pax Corp., 112 F.R.D. 349, 352 (N.D. IlL 1986) (articulating the func-
tional approach).
251. 98 F.R.D. 442 (D. Del. 1982).
252. Id at 444. Also, the approach taken by the Southern District of New York in
Golden Trade reflects the court's sensitivity to the functional equivalency of foreign
non-lawyers and American lawyers. See infra note 254.
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entirely subject to the discretion of the judge or the discovery master,
unguided by definitive rules.
The functional approach also offers a significant practical advantage
over the territorial approach. Making factual inquiries into client ex-
pectations, as well as the substance of each communication and the
function played by the adviser in each instance may be a heavy burden
on the courts. At the same time, however, courts are better equipped
to make such an inquiry than to make a similar inquiry into foreign
laws. To determine the substance of foreign laws, courts may have to
turn to foreign texts and dueling expert witnesses.2 53 In contrast, to
determine whether a foreign legal adviser was engaged in the "sub-
stantive lawyering process," a court could consider sworn affidavits by
the advisers themselves, which describe their professional qualifica-
tions and the process of the advisory relationships.2- 4 Such testimony
could establish the procedural sufficiency of the communications with-
out revealing their substance. Furthermore, because the policy under-
lying the attorney-client privilege is to encourage individuals to seek
professional legal advice, such a review likely would be sufficient to
establish whether the communications are entitled to protection.
In Heidelberg Harris, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.,25-
the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois applied the
functional approach to protect communications between a corpora-
tion and its German in-house patent department staff.2- 6 Defendant
Mitsubishi sought unredacted production of documents created by
members of the plaintiff's patent department in Germany. 57 These
patent department members consisted of a Patentassessor, an in-house
patent attorney who is qualified to practice before the German Patent
Office but who is not able to represent a client before the German
District Court, and two Patentanwaltzskandidats studying to become
Patentassessors.5 8 Reasoning that the substance of the roles assumed
253. Also, courts would have to face the fact that case reporting systems in foreign
countries may be vastly less developed than in the United States. For example, Japan
does not have a uniform case reporting system nor any service equivalent to
Shepard's.
254. See Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514,523-24 (S.D.N.Y.
1992). Although the Golden Trade court followed the "touch base" test, its analysis of
Norwegian, German and Israeli law have a strongly functional orientation. The court
seems to have stopped short of fully adopting the functional approach, choosing to
follow instead a doctrine with more precedential support within the district. As the
Golden Trade court stated: "[Floreign patent agents perform services akin to lawyers
in their field of specialization. Thus ... the invocation of a comparable privilege for
patent agents-whether domestic or foreign-would not be dramatically inconsistent
with the rationale underlying the attorney-client privilege .... " Id. at 522. It may be
arguable that the Golden Trade approach incorporates the functional approach as an
element of its analysis.
255. No. 95 C 0673, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19274 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 9, 1996).
256. Id. at *26-*27.
257. Id. at *2.
258. Iai at *24-*25.
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by the parties is more important to the analysis than the titles attached
to the parties involved, the court held that their communications with
the company were privileged. 5 9 As the court stated, "where a party
who may arguably be termed a foreign patent agent is engaged in the
substantive lawyering process and communicates with his client, the
communication is privileged to the same extent as a communication
between an American attorney and his client."260 The Heidelberg
court's analysis was placed squarely on the question of whether the
adviser was engaged in "the substantive lawyering process."6 1
C. The Tempered Functional Approach
Despite its workability and freedom from the difficulties of a con-
flict of laws analysis, the functional approach does come with a risk of
overly destandardizing the boundaries of privilege. This risk, how-
ever, may be tempered with additional requirements to ensure that
the communication was with a professional legal adviser, thus justify-
ing the protection. Wigmore's standards for professional privilege62
can be used to determine whether a communication meets this stan-
dard. For Wigmore, the purpose of a non-disclosure privilege did not
require that the adviser be a member of a bar. Instead, the crucial
considerations are the function played by the legal adviser, the rela-
tionship based on trust that results from that function, and the expec-
tations created by virtue of that relationship.2 Wigmore listed, as
factors to consider, whether the profession: (1) requires an oath of
office; (2) requires prior proof of professional qualifications; (3) main-
tains a list of registered persons; or (4) has regulations that in any
other way "treat the special practitioners as a licensed body having the
responsibility of attorneys and subject to professional discipline."26
None of the factors listed by Wigmore go to the formalistic-and as
we have seen, misleading-question of whether the legal adviser is a
member of a bar. Instead, they focus on the professional status and
duties of the licensed legal adviser and the degree of reliance that such
status would create among advice-seekers. Whether the foreign coun-
try arguably has a statutory privilege may be a significant additional
consideration, provided that the court understands that privilege may
be based on different justifications in foreign systems.
259. ld. at *27.
260. Id. at *28.
261. Id. at *26-*27. The court also protected the substantive communications with
the two Patentanwaltzskandidats, on the theory that they were acting as the Patenws-
sessor's agents. Id. The court's analysis allows the professional status of the non-law-
yer adviser to be left open to argument, extending privilege to a party "who may
arguably be termed a foreign patent agent." Id. at *28.
262. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
263. Wigmore, supra note 22, § 2300a, at 581-82.
264. I&
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This "tempered" functional approach may have the effect of broad-
ening the privilege to apply to registered patent advisers in almost all
foreign systems. In the patent cases discussed above, the privilege
would protect foreign patent agent communications regarding sub-
stantive legal advice provided that the party asserting the privilege can
prove that the patent agent was acting as the functional equivalent of
a lawyer. For example, the Japanese patent adviser communications
at issue in Alpex 65 would be privileged because the benrishi was pro-
viding substantive legal advice concerning patent infringement, and
because his professional qualifications and status justify the client's
expectation that the communications are protected. Given the ex-
tremely rigorous qualification requirements in foreign systems,266 this
result cannot be called excessive.267 If the attorney-client privilege
can be expanded to cover U.S. patent agents on Sperry's rationale that
they are engaged in a practice of law, the denial of protection to pat-
ent advisers in foreign systems-whose qualification requirements and
professional duties are significantly higher than those of U.S. patent
agents-is artificial and arbitrary. At the same time, the tempered
functional approach would not allow the privilege to extend to com-
munications that, for example, merely concern the prosecution of ap-
plications in a foreign patent office, or communications with an
individual who is not qualified to render any type of legal advice, and
in whom a client cannot have reasonable expectations of
confidentiality. 268
The tempered functional approach might also apply to communica-
tions with other types of foreign legal professionals, such as tax advis-
ers and corporate in-house counsel.2 69 This may affect the outcome of
cases such as Duttle v. Bandler & Kass,27 where the court, following
the bright-line rule of Status Time, rejected an assertion of privilege
265. See supra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
266. See supra Part II.
267. See also Golden Trade, S.r.L. v. Lee Apparel Co., 143 F.R.D. 514, 523
(S.D.N.Y. 1992) (stating that cases that extended privilege to foreign and domestic
patent agents "illustrate the point that recognizing foreign law protection for foreign
patent agent's communications with their foreign clients concerning the prosecution
of foreign patents will not undermine any compelling policy interest reflected in do-
mestic law governing privilege claims").
268. For example, a person who is studying to become a patent adviser and is not
acting as an agent of a registered patent attorney or a lawyer.
269. Under the approach proposed by this Note, communications with corporate
in-house counsel would be protected by attorney-client privilege only if the profession
meets this Note's standards for establishing a privileged relationship. For a Japanese
article arguing that members of Japanese corporate legal departments should be pro-
tected by the U.S. attorney-client privilege, see Yasuhiro Fujita, Honsha homubu no
bukacho wa Beikoku no In-House Counsel to onaji Attorney-Client Privilege o shucho
dekiruka [Is a Japanese Parent Company's Legal Manager Entitled to Attorney-Client
Privilege Enjoyed by U.S. Corporate Counsel?], 21 Kokusai Shoji Homu 410 (1993).
270. 127 F.R.D. 46 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
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covering German tax specialists.271 Under the approach suggested by
this Note, the court would turn to the evidence provided by the party
asserting the privilege to determine whether the tax adviser was acting
as a functional equivalent of a lawyer, both in terms of the substantive
nature of the communications and her professional qualifications. Be-
cause German statutes apply the privilege to communications with tax
advisers,27 a court would likely recognize the privilege provided that
the communication contained substantive legal advice.
The tempered functional approach would extend the attorney-client
privilege to foreign legal professionals who provide limited but impor-
tant advisory services within their own systems. In contrast, much of
the current law in the United States tends to limit the protection of
the attorney-client privilege to American lawyers, thereby casting a
shadow over the purpose and meaning of the privilege itself. Such an
approach is contemptuous of important and legitimate foreign inter-
ests in protecting confidential communications, and undermines the
very policies that underlie the attorney-client privilege. To encourage
effective representation through truthful disclosure by clients to their
authorized legal advisers, courts must be prepared to adapt the doc-
trine to the realities of legal representation around the globe. The
tempered functional approach represents a solution that gives due
deference to the legal communities of both the United States and the
rest of the world.
CONCLUSION
District courts dealing with the legal and cultural complexities of
determining whether privilege applies to communications with foreign
legal professionals have found little guidance from appellate courts or
academic literature. Such courts have had to resort to varying ap-
proaches without clearly defined guideposts, with unpredictable and
inconsistent results. As this Note argues, the goals of the attorney-
client privilege are best served by a tempered functional analysis,
which focuses on whether the foreign adviser was engaged in the "sub-
stantive lawyering process" and whether the foreign adviser possessed
professional qualifications that would justify the client's expectations
of privilege. While no perfect compromise exists, this approach gives
due consideration to differences between American and foreign legal
systems, without significantly impinging on the judicial need for open
disclosure.
271. Id. at 52.
272. The German statutes which the Golden Trade court relied on to extend privi-
lege to German patent agents similarly cover German tax advisers and authorized tax
agents. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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